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O 
Crimea is routinely described as “pro-Russian,” given that an estimated 58 percent of 
the population of two million is ethnic Russian, with another 24 percent Ukrainian 
and 12 percent Crimean Tatar. Many of its inhabitants, regardless of ethnicity, are 
actually Russian citizens or dual-passport holders. But the picture is even more 
complicated. A vital naval base run by another country, a community of patriotic 
military retirees, a multiethnic patchwork, a weak state and competing national 
mythologies—that mixture is why a Crimean conflict has long been the nightmare 
scenario in the former Soviet Union and now represents the gravest crisis in Europe 
since the end of the Cold War. 
Professor Charles King1 
 
 
Crimea had been reunified with the Russian Federation. “We call on everyone to 
respect that voluntary choice,” he said, adding that his Government could not refuse 
Crimeans their right to self-determination. Historical justice had been vindicated, he 
noted, recalling that for many years, Crimea had been part of the Russian Federation, 
sharing a common history, culture and people. An arbitrary decision in 1954 had 
transferred the region to the Ukrainian Republic, upsetting the natural state of affairs 
and cutting Crimea off from Russia. 
 
Summary of comments of Ambassador Anatoly Churkin of the Russian 
Federation before the UN General Assembly, March 27, 20142 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
 n March 16, 2014 the residents of Crimea woke up in Ukraine, as they 
had every morning since the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991. 
That evening they went to sleep in what claimed to be the independent 
Republic of Crimea. They lived in that putative country for the next day. On 
                                                                                                                      
1. Charles King, Ukraine’s Breakaway Region is Becoming a de facto Country, WASHINGTON 
POST (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/ 
09/16/ukraines-breakaway-region-is-becoming-a-de-facto-country/. 
2. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not To 
Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, U.N. Press Release GA/11493 (Mar. 27,  
2014), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm [hereinafter Gen-
eral Assembly Adopts Resolution]. 
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March 18, the leaders of Crimea signed a treaty merging their day-old 
country into Russia.  
Much had taken place before these three days in March 2014. There 
were arguments about Ukraine associating with the European Union (EU) 
or joining a Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. There were warnings 
by Russia. Ukraine’s President Victor Yanukovich surprised his fellow 
citizens and the European Union when he declared, a few days prior to the 
signing ceremony, that Ukraine would not sign the association treaty with 
the EU, after all. There were protests in the Maidan, in other areas of Kiev, 
and then across most of Ukraine. Troops fired on protesters and people 
died. Yanukovich fled or was ousted. Separatists fought for control of 
government buildings in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Almost before 
anyone realized what was happening, Crimea was held by separatists aided 
by “polite men” with military expertise and foreign accents. 
And much else has taken place after those three days in March. Unrest 
spread across eastern Ukraine. Separatists declared one republic after 
another: the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic, 
the Kharkiv People’s Republic, the federal state of Novorossiya.3 These 
self-styled new republics had leadership from the old guard of previous 
secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union.4 Fighting between 
separatist militias and the Ukrainian Army grew in ferocity. New weaponry, 
including artillery and anti-aircraft missiles, were deployed by the 
separatists. A civilian airliner was destroyed, killing all on board. Russian 
troops invaded Ukraine and intervened on behalf of the separatists. The 
government of Russia denied this. Average Russian soldiers posted on 
social media pictures of themselves in Ukraine. Ukraine signed the 
association agreement with the EU. Vladimir Putin called for talks to 
determine the statehood of eastern Ukraine.5 Negotiations among Ukraine, 
                                                                                                                      
3. The People’s Republics of Ukraine, GEOGRAPHIC TRAVELS (June 2, 2014), http://ww 
w.geographictravels.com/2014/06/the-peoples-republics-of-ukraine.htmls. 
4. Philip Shishkin & Lukas I. Alpert, Pro-Russia Rebels Defiant as Ukraine Military 
Advances Toward Donetsk, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 10, 2014), http://online.wsj.com 
/articles/ukraine-forces-take-another-rebel-held-town-1404996939; Irena Chalupa, Needing 
Better Control in Ukraine War, Moscow Sends in an Old KGB Hand, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (July 
17, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/needing-better-control-
in-ukraine-war-moscow-sends-in-an-old-kgb-hand. 
5. The Interpreter, a website that translates and analyzes Russian media reports, states 
that in an interview on Russian television Putin said: 
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Russia, and the EU began. Ukraine and the EU suspended implementation 
of part of their association agreement. A ceasefire was announced. The 
fighting persists. Negotiations continue. 
Some commentators note that Vladimir Putin is an avid chess player; 
and, consequently, they liken the events in Ukraine to a game between him 
and the West. But the conflict over Crimea and eastern Ukraine is not a 
single chess game (or two games, for that matter). It is more accurately 
described as multiple simultaneous games with different combinations of 
players in which the strategies and outcomes of each game can affect those 
of other games. There is one game concerning Russia, Ukraine, and the 
European Union: what will be Ukraine’s future relationship with the EU? 
There is another game about the status of the ethnic Russian populations 
in the former Soviet States (countries that are sometimes called the Russian 
“Near Abroad”). Yet another concerning Russia’s standing in relation to 
the United States. And, as will be discussed below, there are many other 
games taking place as well. 
This article will consider one gambit across multiple games: the use of 
international legal arguments concerning self-determination in Ukraine. I 
have previously addressed similar issues pertaining to international legal 
arguments and conflicts in Russia’s Near Abroad.6 Those articles noted a 
                                                                                                                      
We must immediately get down to a substantial, substantive negotiations [sic], and not on 
technical questions, but on the questions of the political organization of society and statehood 
in the south-east of Ukraine with the purpose of unconditional provision of the lawful interests 
of people who live there. 
  
Putin Calls for Negotiations for “Statehood” for Southeast Ukraine, THE INTERPRETER (Aug. 31, 
2014), http://pressimus.com/Interpreter_Mag/press/4062 (translation by website The 
Interpreter). 
6. In particular, I discussed the evolution and application of the law of self-determination 
as one of the members of the New York City Bar’s mission to Moldova in Special 
Committee on European Affairs, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist 
Crisis in Moldova, 61 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK 196 (2006). I have also written about these issues in Christopher J. Borgen, Public 
International Law and the Conflict Over Transnistria, in MANAGING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS: 
LESSONS FROM MOLDOVA AND CYPRUS 83 (Mensur Akgün ed., 2013) and Christopher J. 
Borgen, Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia’s “Frozen 
Conflicts,” 9 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 477 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345846. I consider how great 
powers utilize the legal rhetoric of self-determination, particularly in the cases of South 
Ossetia and Kosovo in Christopher J. Borgen, Great Powers, Small States, and the Rhetoric of 
Self-Determination: The Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2009), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
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change over time in Russia’s rhetoric. Crimea, however, represents a 
disjuncture with Russia’s previous approach to contested territories in its 
Near Abroad. It also may show a shift in why Russia uses the language of 
international law as part of its diplomatic strategy. 
Part II will review the law of self-determination and examine whether it 
is in tension with the territorial integrity of States. Part III will consider 
Russia’s rhetorical moves concerning self-determination and territorial 
integrity over a series of cases: the separatist crises in Serbia over Kosovo, 
in Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in Ukraine over Crimea 
and eastern Ukraine. In part, this will be about whether Russia has shifted 
its argument away from self-determination, and is re-imagining an old 
rhetoric of ethnicity, culture and the righting of historical wrongs. This 
section will consider how the language of international law is used as the 
rhetoric of diplomacy. Part IV will address how these legal arguments play 
a part in the strategies that Russia has over the multiple simultaneous 
games in play. It will look at how the rhetoric of international legal 
argument is used with different audiences in mind.  
These three sections will show the intertwined relationships of 
international law, diplomatic rhetoric and politico-military strategy. State 
interest will remain the primary determinant of how States act, but each of 
these factors—law, rhetoric and strategy—help decide which path a State 
will attempt to take towards a particular goal. These three factors affect 
each other, sometimes as a constraint and sometimes presenting 
opportunities for maneuver. 
 
II. LAW: THE GORDIAN KNOT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECESSION 
 
Although the self-determination of peoples is mentioned in the UN 
Charter, jurists as recently as the wave of State formation in the mid-1990s 
found that “international law as it currently stands does not spell out all the 
implications of the right to self-determination.”7 The ambiguity of the 
                                                                                                                      
tract_id=1472068. Also, I analyze issues related to great power competition and normative 
regionalism in Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and 
Normative Friction, 32 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=989984.  
7. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 31 INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1497 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Commission, Opinion 
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concept was the source of an ongoing debate over the meaning of self-
determination and its implications for the territorial integrity of States. This 
Part will consider the two main interpretations of the relationship of self-
determination to territorial integrity.  
 
A. The Promise and the Peril of Self-Determination 
 
In a recent panel discussion on self-determination, one leading 
international lawyer repeatedly asked why States are so afraid of self-
determination. Implicit in his query was the sense that self-determination 
was a concept imbued with so much hope and promise that it was strange 
that it also could be the cause of so much anxiety. 
But self-determination has been a source of anxiety for at least a 
century. While Woodrow Wilson included in his Fourteen Points that “all 
nations had a right to self-determination,” he later said in an address to 
Congress: “When I gave utterance to those words, I said them without the 
knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after 
day.”8  
Whether a source of anxiety or not, self-determination has evolved 
since Wilson’s day from political rhetoric into a legal right expressed in 
treaties and customary international law. The first article of the Charter of 
the United Nations states that: “The Purposes of the United Nations are 
. . . [t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”9 
Moreover, the foundational treaties of the modern human rights 
system, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both 
                                                                                                                      
No. 2]. The Badinter Commission was organized by what was then the European 
Community to sort through the legal issues concerning the status of Yugoslavia and its 
possible successor States. 
8. MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 
12 (2002). Self-determination could not be squared with several of Wilson’s other goals, 
such as ensuring Poland’s access to the sea and the modification of Italy’s frontiers; in 
these cases he did not refer to self-determination at all. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 
225 (1994). Kissinger pointed to the willingness to drop the language of self-determination 
in these cases as “the first flaws in the moral symmetry of Wilson’s design.” Id. 
9. U.N. Charter art. 1. The UN reiterated its commitment to self-determination in 
Article 55.  
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have the same text in their first articles: “All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”10 
In 1970, upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the UN, 
the General Assembly passed Resolution 2625, the “Friendly Relations 
Declaration,” which reaffirmed the key principles of the UN system, 
including: 
 
The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples  
 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have 
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political 
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and 
every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter.11 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) further contributed to the 
“legalization” of self-determination. In 1975, the Western Sahara Advisory 
Opinion affirmed “the validity of the principle of self-determination” under 
international law.12 Twenty years later, in the East Timor case, the ICJ not 
only reiterated that self-determination is “one of the essential principles of 
contemporary international law,” but also held that it is an erga omnes 
obligation.13  
Two questions remain unresolved. First: what, precisely, is a “people”? 
How do we know who or what holds this right of self-determination? And, 
second: what does a right of self-determination actually bring? For many, 
this second question can be restated as a fear: “does self-determination 
                                                                                                                      
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
11. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
12. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31–33 (Oct. 16). See also Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21). 
13. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30). See also JOHN DUGARD, 
THE SECESSION OF STATES AND THEIR RECOGNITION IN THE WAKE OF KOSOVO 28 
(2013).  
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mean that a ‘people’ can dismember a ‘State’?” “Are ‘self-determination’ 
and ‘secession’ synonyms?” 
While the UN Charter and subsequent international law developed a 
right of self-determination, territorial integrity is a cornerstone of the UN 
system and of modern international law.14 How do self-determination and 
territorial integrity interact?15 
For Russia, that fear has a name: “Kosovo.” In 2008, Vladimir Putin 
said that the States supporting Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
“have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At the end 
of the day it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and 
hit them in the face.”16 
That second end of the stick was South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But, 
before returning to the ins-and-outs of Russia’s arguments, let us first turn 
to the consensus interpretation and the leading minority view of the law of 
self-determination. 
 
B. The Consensus Interpretation: No Right to Secession 
 
The debate over self-determination is essentially an argument over 
language: what does “self-determination” mean and how does it relate to 
other concepts, such as “secession”? This becomes essentially two 
                                                                                                                      
14. The territorial integrity of States is ensured in UN Charter Article 2(4) which 
states in part: 
 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act 
in accordance with the following Principles. 
  
. . . . 
 
4.  All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.  
 
 
15. As Thomas Franck put it, uti possidetis and self-determination are both 
 
specific products of another time and place, yet both are used frequently and freely in the 
debate about the most important political legal issue of our time: what should be the 
attitude of the international community towards a post-modern neo-tribal population 
inhabiting part of a recognized state which seeks to break away either to form a separate, 
new state or to join another state? 
 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 146 (1995). 
I will discuss the uti possidetis aspect of territorial integrity infra Part III.C. 
16. Kosovo Independence Terrible Precedent: Putin, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Feb. 23, 2008), 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/02/23/46011.html.  
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questions: who or what has a right of self-determination (“what is a 
‘people’?”) and what remedies can one claim if that right is denied? 
 
1. What is a “People”? 
 
As the Canadian Supreme Court put it in Secession of Quebec, its advisory 
opinion concerning self-determination, the meaning of “peoples” is 
“somewhat uncertain.”17 At various points in international legal history, the 
term “people” has been used to signify citizens of a nation-State, the 
inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign power or 
an ethnic group.18  
Equating the term “people” with “nation” has been criticized by some 
for being too restrictive, as it is difficult to show that a group is the near 
totality of an ethnic nation. But defining “people” based on ethnicity could 
be destabilizing to multi-ethnic States. During decolonization, many States 
denied that there was a right of self-determination to ethnic groups within 
colonial territories.19 According to Antonio Cassese, the “UN has remained 
silent in response to claims” by ethnic groups such as the Kurds or the 
Basques seeking self-determination.20 
In the post-colonial era, instead of returning to the older ethnographic 
definition, various commentators have attempted to reframe the analysis by 
defining the idea of “the self-determination of peoples” in non-
ethnographic terms. Professor James Crawford of Cambridge argues that  
 
                                                                                                                      
17. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 123 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Canadian Supreme Court Advisory Opinion].  
18. See, e.g., PATRICIA CARLEY, SELF-DETERMINATION: SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL 
INTEGRITY, AND THE RIGHT TO SECESSION: REPORT FROM A ROUNDTABLE HELD IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S POLICY PLANNING STAFF 4 
(1996), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks7.pdf (noting Professor 
Hurst Hannum’s argument that the idea of self-determination during the era of 
decolonization was not that all peoples had a right to self–determination but rather that all 
colonies had a right to be independent). But see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION 
OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 51 (1995) (stating that by the time the self-
determination language of Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights was adopted in 1955, few States argued that the principle only applied to colonial 
rule). 
19. See CASSESE, supra note 18, at 73. 
20. Id. at 103. 
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the “units” to which the principle of self-determination applies can be best 
understood by not focusing on the term “people.” Rather, 
 
[t]he units to which the principle applies are in general those territories 
established and recognized as separate political units; in particular it 
applies to the following:  
 
(a) trust and mandated territories, and territories treated as non-self-
governing under Chapter XI of the [UN] Charter;  
 
(b) States, excluding for the purposes of the self-determination rule those 
parts of States which are themselves self-determination units as defined;  
 
(c) other territories forming distinct political-geographical areas, whose 
inhabitants are arbitrarily excluded from any share in the government 
either of the region or of the State to which they belong, with the result 
that the territory becomes in effect, with respect to the remainder of the 
State, non-self-governing; and  
 
(d) any other territories or situations to which self-determination is 
applied by the parties as an appropriate solution.21 
 
In this analysis, category (a) essentially refers to former colonies and, as 
such, is not of interest regarding Crimea or eastern Ukraine. Category (b) 
concerns how the total citizenry of a State is itself a self-determination unit.  
Category (d) would apply only if the parties involved (for example, 
Ukraine and the Crimean separatists) agreed that the group in question (the 
population of Crimea) was a separate self-determination unit. The problem 
here, of course, is that the parties have not agreed upon this issue. While 
Crimea did have autonomy within Ukraine, it is not at all clear that the 
Ukrainian government viewed the population as a separate self-
determination unit from the total population of Ukraine. To the contrary 
the Crimean Constitution states in Article 1: “The Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea shall be an integral part of Ukraine and it shall solve, within the 
powers conferred upon it by the Constitution of Ukraine, any and all 
                                                                                                                      
21. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
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matters coming within its terms of reference.”22 Moreover, Article 73 of 
the Ukrainian Constitution requires any referendum concerning territorial 
change to be a referendum of all the citizens of the country,23 casting doubt 
on the idea that the population of Crimea is (in the view of the Ukrainian 
government) a separate self-determination unit, thus making category (d) 
inapplicable. 
The remaining option would be whether Crimea is a self-determination 
unit as described in category (c): “territory becomes in effect, with respect 
to the remainder of the State, non-self-governing.” This is usually discussed 
regarding areas in which the inhabitants have no say in how they may 
govern their own lives. The citizens of Crimea, by contrast, had autonomy: 
their own constitution, particularized local laws that they enacted via a 
Crimean Parliament and enforced through a locally elected executive. 
While the total citizenry of Ukraine is a self-determination unit, it is 
difficult to make the argument that inhabitants just of Crimea or of eastern 
Ukraine constitute separate self-determination units under international 
law. 
 
2. Is Self-Determination a Right to Secession? 
 
While the definition of “self-determination” is contested, “secession” is a 
term that is relatively clear: “Secession is the creation of a new independent 
entity through the separation of part of the territory and population of an 
existing State, without the consent of the latter.”24 
The consensus view is that there is no right to secession under 
international law. “Secession,” legally speaking, is not a synonym for “self-
determination.” The drafting committee for the UN Charter noted that 
“the principle [of self-determination] conformed to the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                      
22. КОНСТИТУЦІЯ АВТОНОМНОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ КРИМ KONSTYTUTSIYA AVTONOM-
NOYI RESPUBLIKY KRYM [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 12, 1999, art. 1 (Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea) [hereinafter Constitution of Autonomous Republic of Crimea]. 
23. KONSTYTUTSIYA UKRAYINY [CONSTITUTION] June 28, 1996, art. 73 (Ukr.) 
[hereinafter Constitution of Ukraine]. 
24. Marcelo Kohen, Introduction to SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 
3 (Marcelo Kohen ed., 2006). See also DUGARD, supra note 13, at 20. There have been 
debates over the application of the term “secession,” most notably over the question as to 
whether it should apply to the formation of new States after the dissolution of a pre-
existing State. The question of how to describe the process of dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an example of such a debate. 
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UN Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of 
peoples and not the right of secession.”25 Interpreting secession as a 
remedy that can be invoked as an operation of law would have clashed 
with the territorial integrity of States. 
The Québec Commission, a group of experts convened by a committee 
of the National Assembly of Québec to provide advice concerning the legal 
issues implicated by a hypothetical secession of Québec, considered this 
question. The Commission found that the right to self-determination is 
context-dependent, that different definitions of “peoples” lead to different 
applications of the right to self-determination and that secession is only 
recognized as a remedy in the case of decolonization.26 In cases other than 
decolonization, there is no right to such “remedial” secession.27 
As long as a State allows a minority group the right to speak its 
language, practice its culture in a meaningful way and participate effectively 
in the political and economic life of its community, then that group is said 
to have internal self-determination. If the requirements for internal self-
determination are not met, then the remedies would be through the 
processes of human rights law: judicialized dispute resolution, adjustments 
made to local laws and regulations, multilateral monitoring and sanctioning, 
and so on. Rather than turning self-determination issues into high-level 
political crises involving the dismemberment of States, the consensus view 
breaks self-determination down into questions and issues that should be 
able to be addressed via the human rights system. 
However, two results of this interpretation bear emphasis. First, simply 
because it is hoped that a self-determination conflict should be able to be 
reframed and solved via human rights mechanisms does not mean that it 
actually can or will be. And, second, while there is no right to secession 
                                                                                                                      
25. 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 296 (1945), as quoted in CASSESE, supra note 18, at 40. See also CASSESE, 
id. at 42 (stating that self-determination does not mean a right to secede). 
26. Thomas M. Franck, Rosalyn Higgins, Alain Pellet, Malcolm N. Shaw & Christian 
Tomuschat, The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty, in 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 241, 
¶ 3.07 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000). 
27. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 247; id. at 248, 279–80 (stating that secession 
is only recognized as a remedy in the case of decolonization); CASSESE, supra note 18, at 40 
(stating that self-determination does not mean a right to secede). But see MALCOLM N. 
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 n.140 (5th ed. 2003) (stating that a posited right of 
remedial secession is “the subject of much debate”). 
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under the consensus view, secession is not illegal, either.28 If anything, 
international law is largely silent regarding secession, and attempted 
secessions are, first and foremost, assessed under domestic law.29 A 
separatist group may secede and in doing so it does not contravene 
international law by the simple act of secession. Secession is neither a right 
under, nor a breach of, international law. International law treats secession 
as a fact. As a matter of modern diplomatic practice, though, secession is 
strongly disfavored. 
  
C. The Leading Minority View: Remedial Secession in Extreme Circumstances  
 
This consensus view may be the majority interpretation, but it is not the 
only one. Some would ask: “What about the cases where human rights 
mechanisms are inadequate, or where the people in question truly want 
their own State, not just a basket of rights in someone else’s country?” The 
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration is perhaps the most-cited source for 
evidence of an emergent rule of customary international law granting a 
right of remedial secession. Besides its general statement in support of the 
right of self-determination noted above in Part II.A, the Declaration also 
contains the so-called “Safeguard Clause”: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
                                                                                                                      
28. A 1996 U.S. Institute of Peace/U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff 
Roundtable stated that:  
 
The United States should . . . make absolutely clear that secession has not been universally 
recognized as an international right. It may choose, on the basis of other interests, to 
support the secessionist claims of a self-determination movement, but not because the 
group is exercising its right to secession, since no such right exists in international law. At 
the same time, an absolute rejection of secession in every case is unsound, because the 
United States should not be willing to tolerate another state’s repression or genocide in 
the name of territorial integrity. Secession can be a legitimate aim of some self-
determination movements, particularly in response to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights and when the entity is potentially politically and economically viable. 
 
CARLEY, supra note 18, at vii. 
29. Concerning the silence of international law, see, e.g., NGUYEN QUOC DINH, 
PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 526, ¶ 344 no. 1 
(2002) (“la sécession n’est pas prise en compte en elle-même par le droit international,” 
that is, “secession in itself is not taken into account by international law”). 
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independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described 
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.30 
 
This wording was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 
25 June 1993.31  
 
This concept was considered in re Secession of Quebec, the advisory 
opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Canadian court 
found that “[a] right to external self-determination (which in this case 
potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) 
arises only in the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully 
defined circumstances . . . .”32 
More recently, in the wake of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, some 
commentators have claimed that the ICJ’s opinion recognized the existence 
of remedial secession by not finding Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence to be illegal. I will consider this, and similar arguments, next. 
 
D. Why a General Right to Remedial Secession Does Not (Currently) Exist 
 
The consensus view and the “extreme circumstances” argument that I 
describe above are generalizations aggregating a range of views held by 
different States around the world. Some of the differences in perspective 
and interpretation can be mapped geographically. 
Stanislav Chernichenko and Vladimir Kotliar describe three 
conferences that took place in 2000–2001, convening lawyers from the 
                                                                                                                      
30. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 11; James Crawford wrote that: “At least it is 
arguable that, in extreme cases of oppression, international law allows remedial secession 
to discrete peoples within a State, and that the ‘safeguard clauses’ in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration and the Vienna Declaration recognize this, even if indirectly.” CRAWFORD, 
supra note 21, at 119. 
31. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 
12, 1993), available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx. 
32. Canadian Supreme Court Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 123. 
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United States, Europe, Russia.33 In general, Chernichenko and Kotliar 
found that self-determination and secession were treated as two separate 
concepts by Western lawyers, although there were gradations of views.34 
They described the summary document of the U.S. conference as “rather 
firmly stat[ing] that the maintenance of a people’s identity does not 
necessarily require secession but may be achieved through other means of 
internal self-determination such as devolution of power, administrative and 
cultural autonomy, creation of local government, etc.”35 However, 
European lawyers contended there is a “presumption in contemporary 
international law against secession and against recognition of new States” 
established in a contested secession.36  
By contrast to these Western views, Russian lawyers framed secession 
as the ultimate expression of self-determination.37 Theoretically, then, 
Russian international lawyers would be the most amenable to the “extreme 
circumstances” view. As will be described below, though, the manner in 
which they interpret the extreme circumstances necessary to give rise to 
remedial secession has been so severe (well, “extreme”) as to make the 
possibility of remedial secession a very narrow case. 
Taken together, these views show that while there are international 
lawyers who argue in favor of interpreting self-determination to include a 
right to secession, such a framework does not as of yet exist as positive 
international law.38 
Consider the counter-factual: if there was a right to remedial secession 
outside of the colonial context, then it would have to have been created 
either by treaty or by customary international law. Yet no such treaty exists. 
                                                                                                                      
33. Stanislav V. Chernichenko & Vladimir S. Kotliar, Ongoing Global Legal Debate on 
Self-Determination and Secession: Main Trends, in SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CONFLICT AND AVOIDANCE – REGIONAL APPRAISALS 76 (Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003). 
34. Id. at 83. 
35. Id. at 82. 
36. Id. at 83. See also FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 15, at 151–52 (noting a preference 
of the international community for territorial integrity over self-determination leading to 
separation). 
37. Chernichenko & Kotliar, supra note 33, at 83. For a discussion of the concept of 
comparative international law, see Boris N. Mamlyuk & Ugo Mattei, Comparative 
International Law, 36 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (2011). 
38. For another discussion of this topic, see Katherine Del Mar, The Myth of Remedial 
Secession, in STATEHOOD AND SELF DETERMINATION: RECONCILING TRADITION AND 
MODERNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (Duncan French ed., 2013). 
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What of a customary right to remedial secession? For that to be the case 
there would need to be State practice based on a sense of legal obligation.  
State practice does not support a customary right of secession. Time 
and again we find great powers and small States speaking of the 
importance of territorial integrity as a cornerstone of the international 
system. Of course, secessions happen, but the rules of the State system 
(including rules of recognition, international organization membership and 
so on) are stacked against aspirant States that come into being by seceding. 
That does not make secession illegal under international law, just politically 
disfavored by the members of the international system. Secession is 
probably less politically disfavored in some situations, but that does not 
mean it has become generally accepted as a right.  
Even where we do see new States coming into being, such as in the 
former Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, almost no State said these new 
countries came into existence by operation of a right to remedial secession. (To 
the contrary, the Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 
(Badinter Commission) took pains not to say that and disfavored the 
arguments of entities that tried to claim such a right.) 
Considering secessionist conflicts since the end of World War II, there 
are (depending on one’s criteria) perhaps between one and three examples 
of secessions contested by the pre-existing States that were both successful “on 
the ground” and were also accepted and recognized by a significant portion 
of the international community: Bangladesh, and possibly Kosovo and 
South Sudan.39 By contrast, in that period there have been at least twenty (as 
                                                                                                                      
39. But see CRAWFORD supra note 21, at 415 (stating that only Bangladesh was a 
successful secession). Crawford disqualifies Eritrea because the Transitional Government 
of Ethiopia supported Eritrean independence after a plebiscite. Others view this as a 
successful secession because the overthrow of the previous Ethiopian government and the 
installation of the Transitional Government can be viewed as part of the overall conflict. 
Instances of secession outside of the colonial context since the Second World War 
include: Senegal (1960); Singapore (1965); Bangladesh (1971); Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia (1991); the eleven successor States of the USSR (1991); the five successor States 
of Yugoslavia (1990s); the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993); and Eritrea (1993). 
Crawford did not include Kosovo (as the Kosovar declaration had not yet occurred). 
However, Crawford notes that in the cases of Senegal, Singapore, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, each was separated pursuant to separation agreements or operations of their 
domestic constitutions. Moreover, the USSR capitulated on the secession of the Baltic 
States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and as of September 6, 1991 no longer contested 
their departure. The successor States of the USSR and those of Yugoslavia were formed 
due to dissolution of the pre-existing States, not secession. Id. at 392–402. 
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yet) attempted secessions that have not been accepted by the international 
community.40 
In sum, there is very little, if any, State practice to support remedial 
secession outside of the colonial context.  
Nor are there clear statements of opinio juris, even regarding cases of 
oppression. The Safeguard Clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration is 
not good evidence of opinio juris. Since the Declaration, States, in their 
official pronouncements have backed away from the remedial secession 
language as a matter of right. If opinio juris supporting a right to remedial 
secession existed, then the ICJ would not have written the following in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion: 
 
Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and 
peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the 
international law of self-determination confers upon part of the 
population of an existing State a right to separate from that State is, 
however, a subject on which radically different views were expressed by 
those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position on the 
question. Similar differences existed regarding whether international law 
provides for a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what 
circumstances. There was also a sharp difference of views as to whether 
the circumstances which some participants maintained would give rise to 
a right of “remedial secession” were actually present in Kosovo.41 
 
                                                                                                                      
I list Kosovo only as a “maybe” because although 110 UN member States recognize 
it, it is not a member of the UN. (Although in comparison to other examples it is very 
successful in having secured recognition from most of the key States in its region, as well 
as the United States and others.) South Sudan is also listed as a “maybe” since South 
Sudan’s separation was based on operation of the provisions of a peace agreement.  
40. Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan); Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina); The 
Karen and Shan States (Burma); Tibet (China); Katanga (Congo); Turkish Federal 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus); Abkhazia (Georgia); South Ossetia (Georgia); East 
Punjab (India); Kashmir (India); Kurdistan (Iraq/Turkey); Anjouan (Islamic Republic of 
the Comoros); Gagauzia (Moldova); Transnistria (Moldova); Biafra (Nigeria); Bougainville 
(Papua New Guinea); Chechnya (Russian Federation); Somaliland (Somalia); Tamil Elam 
(Sri Lanka); and Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen). This original version of this list 
is from CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 403; I have made some changes due to subsequent 
history and my own analysis of the situations. 
41. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 82 (July 22) [hereinafter 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion]. 
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Based on this, there is neither adequate State practice nor opinio juris to 
claim a right of remedial secession under customary international law. 
Within this context of law as it is at this time, how we should understand 
Russian arguments concerning self-determination and secession? 
 
III. RHETORIC: THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN ARGUMENTS FROM 
KOSOVO TO CRIMEA, FROM TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY TO 
TERRITORIAL IRREDENTISM 
 
A. Overview 
 
For President Putin, the situation in Crimea has its roots in Kosovo. 
Kremlin watchers have argued that the loss of Kosovo was a traumatic 
experience for President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In his 
speech of March 18 declaring that Crimea was “reuniting” with Russia, 
President Putin revisited the disagreements over Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence: 
 
I do not like to resort to quotes, but in this case, I cannot help it. Here is 
a quote from . . . [an] official document: the Written Statement of the 
United States America of April 17, 2009, submitted to the same UN 
International Court in connection with the hearings on Kosovo. Again, I 
quote: “Declarations of independence may, and often do, violate 
domestic legislation. However, this does not make them violations of 
international law.” End of quote. They wrote this, disseminated it all over 
the world, had everyone agree and now they are outraged. Over what? 
The actions of Crimean people completely fit in with these instructions, 
as it were. For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have 
full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and 
Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed. Again, one wonders why.42 
 
Putin was not the only one to echo the Kosovo debate. In what was 
likely a reference to the arguments by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and others that Kosovo’s situation was a “special case,”43 
                                                                                                                      
42. Vladimir Putin, President, Russian Federation, Address Before the State Duma 
deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society 
representatives in the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014) (transcript available at http://eng.krem 
lin.ru/transcripts/6889) [hereinafter Putin, Crimea Address]. 
43. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained: 
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview in September 
2014, he believes “that Crimea was a very special case, a unique case from 
all points of view. Historically, geopolitically, and patriotically, if you 
wish.”44 
Such rhetorical mirroring could be intended to make it difficult for the 
United States to condemn Russian actions, understanding that the legal fine 
points of distinguishing the cases of Kosovo and Crimea would be lost in 
the rough sport of political argument. It could also be an example of a tit-
for-tat diplomatic strategy, in which Russia is signaling to the United States 
that interpretive moves made by the United States will be used by Russia as 
well, thus incentivizing constrained interpretations by the United States.45 
In any case, Russia’s shift in rhetoric can be legally significant as it builds 
State practice for particular interpretations of the concepts of self-
determination and secession.  
As Nico Krisch has explained, in some cases “powerful states tend to 
use international law as a means of regulation as well as of pacification and 
stabilization of their dominance”; in others, “faced with the hurdles of 
equality and stability that international law erects, they withdraw from it.”46 
Dominant States do not usually maintain static approaches to international 
law, but rather “oscillate” between instrumentalization and withdrawal.47 
For Russia, that oscillation is couched as an evolving understanding of 
international law. While Russia may be oscillating away from the consensus 
                                                                                                                      
The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation—including the 
context of Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration—are not found 
elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent 
for any other situation in the world today. 
 
Press Release, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as 
Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm 
/2008/02/100973.htm..
 
44. Interview with Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister (Sept. 11, 2014) 
(transcript available at Sergey Lavrov: Throwing Russia Off Balance is Ultimate Aim, ITAR-TASS 
(Sept. 11, 2014.), http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/748935) [hereinafter Lavrov Interview]. 
45. Regarding “tit-for-tat” as a diplomatic strategy, see generally ROBERT AXELROD, 
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
46. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of 
the International Legal Order, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 369, 371 
(2005). 
47. Id. at 379. 
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view of international law, rather than withdrawal from legal rhetoric, it is 
constructing its own “legal” framework.  
This Part will chart how Russia’s interpretation of self-determination 
has changed over the last decade. In Part IV, I will consider the strategic 
uses of Russia’s changing arguments.  
 
B. Russia’s Rhetoric of Self-Determination: Ad Hoc Justifications or Evolving Theory? 
 
In assessing Russia’s shifting arguments concerning self-determination and 
territorial integrity, a fundamental question is whether arguments deployed 
regarding Kosovo, South Ossetia and Crimea are different due to an 
evolving theory of self-determination or are simply tactical justifications to 
fit the situation.  
Before assuming one or the other answer too quickly, one needs to 
keep in mind what has been relatively consistent in Russia’s statements 
concerning self-determination. Although Russia has tried to maintain room 
for its own maneuver by exploiting the ambiguous nature of self-
determination, up through the debate over Kosovo status it has primarily 
used a rhetoric based on territorial integrity and sovereignty. This led to 
critiques of hypocrisy in the cases of Russia’s support for separatists in 
Transnistria (Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and pre-Kosovo 
independence South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia). However, prior to 
Kosovo’s independence, despite the significant political, military, economic 
and logistical support it supplied to these separatists, Russia paid lip-service 
to the sovereignty of the pre-existing States and did not formally recognize 
any of the separatist regimes. After Kosovo, Russia altered how it 
described the legal issues concerning these situations and its diplomatic 
approach shifted as well.  
This section will consider this period of change though the optic of 
Russian official statements in public fora such as speeches by the Russian 
President and Foreign Minister, statements made before the United 
Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and positions taken in 
proceedings before the ICJ. Such statements are attempts to frame 
justifications for various audiences, including the Russian public, the 
publics and political elites of the Russian Near Abroad, the United States, 
EU member States and key partners such as China. The use of legal 
language can also deter other States who are not directly involved from 
intervening. 
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I will also consider analyses by notable Russian legal academics, 
particularly those that are addressing a broader audience, such as the 
professional community of international lawyers around the world. Tarja 
Långström has argued that “scholarship of international law is still closely 
intertwined with the state” and that “‘official political thinking’ plays a far 
more dominant role in Russian international law scholarship, than, say, in 
the United States where academic lawyers perceive their role more as critics 
of government than its advocates.”48 In the post-Stalin years, when the 
inevitability of war with capitalist States was no longer an ideological given, 
Soviet international law scholars could assume there was a single 
international legal system for all States.49 Their arguments often turned on 
showing how the West violated the norms of that system. In the era of 
perestroika, the State-centric view began to be set aside for a new 
cosmopolitan humanism.50 However, the Western-oriented policies that 
were adopted soon after the end of the USSR were then overtaken by a 
new assertiveness of Russian prerogatives and Russian conceptions of 
legality.51 Anton Moiseienko wrote in September 2014 that “so far Russian 
academics and practitioners have largely remained in the shade, at least on 
the international arena, while Russian State officials felt free to interpret 
international law up to the point of redesigning it.”52  
In order to assess Russia’s arguments, I will first turn to how Russia 
has answered (if at all) the questions of “what is a people?” and “does self-
determination entail a right to secession?” in the cases of Kosovo and/or 
South Ossetia, and then move forward to current statements regarding 
Crimea. I will also consider two other related issues that have figured 
prominently in Russia’s rhetoric: the role of referenda and the norms of 
recognition of new States. Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence, 
Russia has further de-emphasized sovereignty and territorial integrity in 
talking about the countries of its Near Abroad. In Part C, which follows, I 
                                                                                                                      
48. TARJA LÅNGSTRÖM, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
169 (2003). 
49. Id. at 167. 
50. Id. at 108. 
51. Id. at 120. 
52. Anton Moiseienko, Guest Post: What do Russian Lawyers Say about Crimea?, OPINIO 
JURIS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-say-
crimea/. I am a co-founder and editor of Opinio Juris. 
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will discuss how Russia has started a new argument based on what it 
perceives as righting historical injustices. 
 
1. Are the Populations of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine Self-Determination 
Units? 
 
In its written submission to the ICJ during the proceedings concerning the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Russia provided a definition of people emphasizing 
that “[i]t is widely accepted that a population of a trust or mandated 
territory, of a non-self-governing territory, or an existing State, taken as a 
whole, undisputedly qualifies as a people entitled to self-determination.”53 
Without clearly defining what meaning “non-self-governing territory” 
would have outside of the colonial context, the point of emphasis was that 
the population of a State “taken as a whole” is clearly a self-determination 
unit. This statement was immediately followed by: “Whether, and under 
which conditions an ethnic or other group within an existing State may 
qualify as a people, is subject to extensive debates.”54 This undercuts claims 
by sub-national groups that they are self-determination units. 
In the oral proceedings Russia continued with this interpretation: “the 
words ‘the will of the people’ do not necessarily refer to the population of 
Kosovo only and could very well encompass the whole population of the 
country concerned, or else reflect the general notion of ‘popular will’ as a 
principle of democracy.”55 
Considering Russia’s interpretation of the term “will of the people” in 
later years, it is interesting to note that here Russia argued that the term 
should refer to the will of all the citizens of Serbia (including Kosovo), not 
just those located in Kosovo. 
Russia’s explanation in the oral proceedings also argued that whether 
or not a group is a “people” cannot be based on the fact of administrative 
autonomy within an existing State. The group claiming to be a self-
determination unit needs to be a people based on its own characteristics, as 
opposed to the administrative structure of the pre-existing State: 
 
                                                                                                                      
53. Written Statement of the Russian Federation, Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra 
note 41, ¶ 81 (Apr. 16, 2009). 
54. Id. 
55. Oral Statement by Russian Federation, Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 41, 
¶ 16 (Dec. 8, 2009). 
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[T]he authors of the UDI and their supporters have spent considerable 
efforts to show that the population of Kosovo should be regarded as a 
people for the purposes of self-determination due to the particularities of 
the federal structure of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
main points have been made about the scope of competences of Kosovo 
and the fact that it was directly represented at the federal level. But that is 
hardly relevant. What matters is the legal qualification of a given 
population as of a people. And that is something that is obviously lacking 
from the successive Constitutions of Socialist Yugoslavia.56 
 
In sum, according to Russia, “[t]he population of Kosovo has never been 
recognized as a self-determination unit.”57 
Regarding Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Russian Federation 
government and legal elites closely tied with the government have simply 
stated that the population of Crimea is a “people,” without any further 
explanation. Anatoly Kapustin, the President of the Russian Association of 
International Law wrote in a June 2014 open letter to the members of the 
International Law Association that “the leaders of the USA and the EU 
opposed in rigid tones the expressed will of [the] Crimea people by means 
of a referendum and against realization by [the] Crimea people of the 
principle of self-determination of peoples.”58 
In his presidential speech on Crimea, Putin underscored not the 
uniqueness of the Crimean people, but rather their ties to Russia: 
“Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride.”59 He 
further emphasized that Crimea is similar to Russia by its multi-ethnicity: 
“Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This 
makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has 
been lost over the centuries.”60 
Certain Russian international law academics did set out arguments for 
the population of Crimea being a self-determination unit. Anton 
Moiseienko wrote: “With regard to international law, several participants of 
                                                                                                                      
56. Id., ¶ 10.  
57. Id., ¶ 24. 
58. Letter from Anatoly Kapustin, President of the Russian Association of 
International Law, to Executive Council, International Law Association (June 2014), 
available at http://www.mgimo.ru/study/faculty/mp/kmp/news/n252984.phtml [here-
inafter Kapustin Letter]. 
59. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. 
60. Id. 
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the April 2014 conference grappled with the issue of whether Crimea’s 
population is a ‘nation’ for the purposes of the right to self-determination. 
In their view, the predominantly Russian population of the peninsula ought 
to qualify as a separate ‘nation.’”61 How this would be able to be squared 
with Russia’s arguments against, for example, the people of Kosovo being 
a self-determination unit remains unclear.  
Russian statements instead focus on the “coup” against Ukrainian 
President Yanukovich as frustrating the political will of the population of 
Crimea. Russian rhetoric also emphasizes that the people or peoples of 
Crimea have long historical ties to Russia. Both of these arguments imply 
that the population of Crimea is a separate self-determination unit from the 
citizens of Ukraine as a whole, but neither explains why that would be the 
case. 
Kapustin argued in his open letter that the “Russian-speaking 
population of the southeastern regions of Ukraine demands the respect for 
their rights, traditions, culture and language.”62 While it is one thing to note 
that the population of southeastern Ukraine has a language (Russian) and 
culture that is different from the majority of Ukrainians, that does not 
make them a separate people. If this were true, then every ethnic or 
linguistic enclave in the world would be a different self-determination unit. 
Such an interpretation would neither conform to State practice in general 
nor with Russia’s pointed arguments from the Kosovo proceedings about 
what makes a self-determination unit. 
The question that needs to be answered is whether the Ukrainian 
citizens in eastern Ukraine are actually a separate people, a “self-
determination unit” distinct from the rest of Ukraine’s citizens. While 
Kapustin does not actually set out a rigorous argument in terms of whether 
the population of eastern Ukraine is a separate self-determination unit, he 
does make some impressionistic sketches of an argument, noting shared 
history and culture of eastern Ukraine and Russia, as well as Crimea’s 
autonomous status:  
 
Ethnic Russians in Ukraine, particularly in the south-eastern 
regions, are not a minority. The territory that has been an 
independent state of Ukraine since 1991 previously was a part of the 
                                                                                                                      
61. Moiseienko, supra note 52.   
62. Kapustin Letter, supra note 58 (boldface in original). 
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USSR, and even earlier—for centuries—it was a part of the Russian 
Empire. This is a historic evidence [sic].63 
 
Keep in mind that Russia argued in the Kosovo proceedings that 
administrative facts, such as a status of autonomy, are irrelevant in 
determining whether or not an entity is a self-determination unit. 
Kapustin’s argument seems to be less about making a technical claim that 
eastern Ukraine is a self-determination unit and more about fashioning a 
persuasive rhetoric based on shared history, as if this somehow lessens 
Ukraine’s sovereign rights over the territory. The idea of shared culture and 
history between all of Ukraine (and especially eastern Ukraine) and Russia 
is a theme that has been consistently emphasized in Russian statements.64 
What is surprising about this is who made the argument and to whom it 
was being made. Kapustin is one of Russia’s most prominent living public 
international lawyers. His letter was to other public international lawyers 
around the globe. And yet his argument set aside what had been the more-
or-less common approach to defining a self-determination unit (let alone 
Russia’s approach) and simply painted in broad strokes. It is as if the 
Russian leadership realized that it would be on shaky ground if it tried to 
build anything like a classic argument based on self-determination; so, 
instead, it began a parallel construction based on history and cultural 
affinity. As I will explain in Part IV, this is a new form of argument that 
may assuage the concerns of certain audiences, particularly China, but may 
prove alarming to the leaders of countries in the Russian Near Abroad that 
have large ethnic Russian populations. 
In any case, the idea of eastern Ukraine as part of Russian history, and 
especially how this may relate to its separation from Ukraine, is underlined 
by the return of the idea of “Novorossiya,” described in Foreign Policy as the 
                                                                                                                      
63. Id. (boldface in original). 
64. Id. Concerning Ukraine’s affinity with Russia more generally, he wrote: 
 
Many people in Ukraine speak Russian as a first language and consider Russia a 
closely related country rather than a foreign one. Russian-speaking people in Ukraine 
are not immigrants. They were born there. This is the land of their parents and 
ancestors. Ukraine is their Slavic motherland. Russian culture and history are their 
native. There are many family linked people in Russia and Ukraine.  
 
Id. (boldface in original). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rebirth of a forgotten geopolitical term.65 Anne Applebaum wrote in Slate 
magazine on August 29, 2014: 
 
In the past few days, Russian troops bearing the flag of a previously 
unknown country, Novorossiya, have marched across the border of 
southeastern Ukraine. The Russian Academy of Sciences recently 
announced it will publish a history of Novorossiya this autumn, 
presumably tracing its origins back to Catherine the Great. Various maps 
of Novorossiya are said to be circulating in Moscow. Some include 
Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk, cities that are still hundreds of miles away 
from the fighting. Some place Novorossiya along the coast, so that it 
connects Russia to Crimea and eventually to Transnistria, the Russian-
occupied province of Moldova.66 
 
Applebaum is describing constructing a historical narrative in order to 
form a national identity, where perhaps none existed before. Legal rhetoric 
of who is or is not a “people” can play a part in constructing an identity. 
However, although statements by Russian political leaders and 
international lawyers gave a general sense of the populations of Crimea and 
eastern Ukraine being different from the rest of Ukraine, they did not 
clearly state that either population met the formal criteria of being a self-
determination unit. The closest that some of the analyses came to this was 
in implying that the ouster of Yanukovich frustrated the internal self-
determination of the population of Crimea (and possibly eastern Ukraine), 
as he was politically popular in these parts of the country.67  
                                                                                                                      
65. Christian Caryl, Novorossiya is Back from the Dead, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/17/novorossiya-is-back-from-the-dead/. 
66. Anne Applebaum, War in Europe, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/08/vladimir_putin_s_troops_have_invaded_
ukraine_should_we_prepare_for_war_with.html. 
67. Moiseienko described Russian academic international lawyers at an April 2014 
conference as arguing that “no internal self-determination was possible for the residents 
of Crimea in ‘pro-fascist’ Ukraine.” Moiseienko, supra note 52. The claim that 
Yanukovich’s leaving office was the result of an anti-democratic coup relates to another 
ongoing theme in Russian arguments concerning the Near Abroad: that the “color 
revolutions” of the 2000s were Western-sponsored covert operations meant to encircle 
Russia. Lavrov argued that the “color revolutions” were not examples of average citizens 
yearning for democracy: 
 
The operations to change regimes in sovereign states and the foreign-orchestrated ‘color 
revolutions’ of different brands produce obvious damage to the international stability. The 
attempts to impose one’s own designs for internal reforms on other peoples, which don’t 
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 But this places the cart before the horse by assuming these 
populations had separate rights of internal self-determination. Perhaps this 
argument was meant to be a stand-in for saying that Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine were non-self governing territories. But, given that Crimea actually 
had autonomous status with its own parliament and local political 
leadership, it is difficult to make this claim sound credible. 
 
2. What is the Remedy? 
 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the populations of Crimea and of 
eastern Ukraine are self-determination units, how have Russian lawyers and 
political leaders answered the question whether there was a right to 
secession? 
One leading Russian treatise that addresses self-determination is 
International Law—A Russian Introduction, edited by Valeriĭ Kuznetsov and 
Bakhtiiar Tuzmukhamedov of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68 The English edition, with a forward by 
Foreign Minister Lavrov, was published in the wake of NATO’s Kosovo 
campaign in 1999, but prior to Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia. It emphasized 
the importance and broad nature of territorial integrity and inviolability. 
Territorial integrity “is the protection of the territory of a State against any 
infringement from without.”69 The importance of the protection of a 
                                                                                                                      
take into account national characteristics, to ‘export democracy’, impact destructively 
international relations and multiplies the number of flashpoints on the world map. 
 
See West’s Expansion to the East Ruins Historic Chance at Unification—Lavrov, RUSSIA TODAY 
(May 23, 2014), http://rt.com/news/160940-lavrov-security-west-expansion/. For a 
longer analysis of the “color revolutions,” see LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE COLOR 
REVOLUTIONS (2012). 
68. It is actually a collective work, with about nineteen authors. VALERIĬ I. 
KUZNETSOV & BAKHTIIAR R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, INTERNATIONAL LAW—A RUSSIAN 
INTRODUCTION xix (William E. Butler ed. & trans., 2009).  
69. Id. at 140. In full, the quote reads (emphasis added): 
 
Territorial integrity is the protection of the territory of a State against any infringement from 
without; no one should make [an] attempt against the territory of a State for the purposes 
of full or partial occupation thereof or penetrate into its land, underground, maritime, or 
airspace against the will of the authorities of the particular State.  
 
The authors also explained that Russia’s views of territorial inviolability went beyond 
just territorial integrity. While the unsanctioned intrusion of a foreign aircraft may not 
violate territorial integrity, it “would be a violation of territorial inviolability.” Id. at 140. 
The authors go on to note, that: “[t]he transit, for example, of any means of transport 
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State’s territory also plays a part in their analysis of the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, noting that “[a]ccording to the 1970 Declaration, the use of 
references to self-determination to undermine the unity of a State is 
inadmissible.”70 The authors go on to quote the second half of the Savings 
Clause and explain that the right of self-determination may lead “to a 
disruption of territorial integrity, but only in those States where the 
principle of equality and self-determination of peoples is not observed, the 
entire people are not represented in agencies of power, and individual 
ethno-territorial parts of the State are subject to discrimination.”71  
Although this does allow for the possibility of remedial secession, it 
sets the bar high. The treatise also struck a note of caution concerning the 
use of the rhetoric of self-determination: 
 
One cannot fail to note that in recent years the threat of abusing this 
principle has arisen and become a reality. Political, nationalist, separatist, 
criminal, and other factors often are becoming the driving force for using 
the principle for mercenary purposes. For many States a real threat to 
territorial integrity has been created. Therefore, the realization of this 
principle should not lead to the destruction of existing States.72 
 
The authors concluded by emphasizing the rights of States as well as 
the interests of other peoples geographically close to the people in 
question: 
 
[T]he realization by a people of its right to self-determination must be 
effectuated only in accordance with the freely-expressed will of the 
respective State(s), taking into account the legal rights and interests of 
other peoples residing on this or neighboring territories, and also with 
due regard to other basic principles of contemporary international law.73 
 
                                                                                                                      
across foreign territory without the authorization of authorities of the particular State is a 
violation of the inviolability not only of the boundaries, but also of the territory since it is 
being used in transit.” Id. at 142. Russia will take a different view of territorial inviolability 
when it begins sending convoys into eastern Ukraine in support of the separatists. 
70. Id. at 150. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 150–51. 
73. Id. at 151. 
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This mode of analysis considers the goals of the people in question in 
light of the rights of the pre-existing State and (in a formulation that is not 
seen as often) in relation to the rights of other peoples in the region. Such 
complex balancing would make claims of a right to secede relatively 
difficult to maintain.  
In the 1990s Russia was concerned about its own restive nationalities, 
Chechnya in particular. The Russian concern with secessionism was 
reflected in its domestic jurisprudence. According to James Summers, the 
Friendly Relations Declaration was 
 
considered by the First and Second Russian Constitutional Courts in the 
Tatarstan (1993) and Chechnya (1995) cases. In Tatarstan, the Russian 
Constitutional Court, referring to the Declaration, considered that it 
emphasized, “the impermissibility of making reference to the principle of 
self-determination in order to jeopardize state and national unity.” In the 
Chechnya case the Russian state was assumed to be representative, despite 
a violent secessionist struggle that was taking place in Chechnya at the 
time. All this supports a relatively restrictive interpretation of the 
provision.74 
 
In its written submission to the ICJ in the Kosovo proceedings, Russia 
interpreted the Safeguard Clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration in a 
similar manner as the treatise, stating that 
 
[T]he Russian Federation is of the view that the primary purpose of the 
“safeguard clause” is to serve as a guarantee of territorial integrity of 
States. It is also true that the clause may be construed as authorizing 
secession under certain conditions. However, those conditions should be 
limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack 
by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in 
question. Otherwise, all efforts should be taken in order to settle the 
tension between the parent State and the ethnic community concerned 
within the framework of the existing State.75 
 
                                                                                                                      
74. James Summers, Russia and Competing Spheres of Influence: The Case of Georgia, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 109 
(Matthew Happold ed., 2012) (citations omitted). 
75. Written Statement of the Russian Federation, supra note 53, ¶ 88. 
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Once again, Russia minimized recourse to remedial secession, noting that 
“the very existence” of the people in question must be at issue. 
In 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called Kosovo’s potential 
separation from Serbia a “subversion of all the foundations of international 
law, . . . [a] subversion of those principles which, at huge effort, and at the 
cost of Europe’s pain, sacrifice and bloodletting have been earned and laid 
down as a basis of its existence.”76 In Russia’s view, even action by the 
Security Council could not legalize secession against the wishes of the pre-
existing State. This position of the Russian Federation, which it held since 
the Kosovo issue arose on the Security Council agenda, was based on 
general principles of international law—it was unacceptable for the Security 
Council to encourage or authorize any action that would dismember a 
sovereign State.77 
But, less than a year later, when discussing Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia, Foreign Minister Lavrov shifted from an argument based on 
territorial integrity to a one based on the protection of co-nationals or co-
ethnics: 
 
We can’t understand why those who are talking about the responsibility 
to protect and about security of the person at every turn, forgot it when it 
came to the part of the former Soviet space where the authorities began 
to kill innocent people, appealing to sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
For us, the issue in South Ossetia was to protect our citizens directly on 
the borders of Russia, not in the Falkland Islands.78  
 
This idea of protecting Russians, who were once all part of the USSR but 
are now separated from Russia by these new 1992 boundaries became a 
recurring theme in Russian public diplomacy. 
In addition to the protection of ethnic Russians, in his March 18 
speech concerning Crimea President Putin also considered his 
interpretation of historical wrongs. There was nothing about remedial 
secession directly. Rather, he spent the opening sections of his speech 
                                                                                                                      
76. Paul Reynolds, Legal Furore over Kosovo Recognition, BBC (Feb. 16, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm. 
77. Oral Statement by Russian Federation, supra note 56, ¶ 30. 
78. Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation, 
DIPLOMATIC YEARBOOK 2008 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), 
available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/bc2150e 
49dad6a04c325752e0036e93f?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lavrov, YEARBOOK]. 
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decrying the historical mistake of Khruschev handing Crimea over to 
Ukraine “like a sack of potatoes.”79 
While (Serbia’s) sovereignty and territorial integrity were the focus of 
Russian diplomacy concerning Kosovo, there was little talk about 
protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. “It is also obvious that there is no 
legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to.”80 And 
then, as Putin described the situation, “the residents of Crimea and 
Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and their 
lives.”81 Once again, this is an argument based on the protection of co-
ethnics and on territorial irredentism. Borders and sovereignty can become 
rather wispy and insubstantial when you hear the call of people of the same 
ethnicity or who speak the same language as you do. Until recently many 
were not even Russian citizens, but they had recently become holders of 
Russian Federation passports through a process of “passportization” of 
ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad.82 
 
3. The Role of Referenda 
 
Perhaps due to the difficulty of building a persuasive argument for Crimea 
seceding as a matter of right, either under the consensus interpretation or 
under Russia’s previous interpretations of the law of self-determination, 
much of the rhetoric of Russian officials has revolved around the 
importance of referenda. The process of the referendum becomes a 
substitute for the substantive law of self-determination. Vladimir Putin said in 
August that: “We did not annex [Crimea], we did not seize it, we gave 
people the opportunity to express themselves and make a decision and we 
treated that decision with respect.”83 In a September 2014 interview 
replying to critics of Russian policy, Foreign Minister Lavrov contrasted 
the situation in Crimea to that of Kosovo: 
                                                                                                                      
79. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. 
80. Id. 
81. Id.  
82. Regarding passportization in Crimea, see Justin A. Evison, Migs and Monks in 
Crimea: Russia Flexes Cultural and Military Muscles, Revealing Dire Need for Balance of Uti 
Possidetis and Internationally Recognized Self-Determination, 220 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 90, 
121 (2014). 
83. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Comments at Seliger 2014 National Youth 
Forum (Aug. 29, 2014) (transcript available at http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/22864) 
[hereinafter Putin, August Comments]. 
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Crimea saw a referendum and it could not be staged. A lot of journalists, 
including foreign ones, who were doing their job in the peninsula at that 
moment acknowledged this. . . .  
 
In response to reproaches from our western partners we tell them that in 
Kosovo their policy was quite different. There was no referendum, as 
well as there had been no crisis before part of Serbia was declared 
independent. There were no threats to Kosovo’s people.84 
 
Russia maintained that one of the key differences between Kosovo and 
Crimea was the fact that a referendum was held in the latter in March 2014 
(with no mention of issues of procedural flaws). Following suit, the leaders 
of the separatist-held areas in eastern Ukraine conducted their own 
referendum on May 11, 2014, largely modeled on the Crimean referendum. 
They announced a result in favor of unification with Russia. However, 
Russia was notably muted in its response, with the Kremlin’s press office 
stating, “Moscow respects the will of the people in Donetsk and Luhansk 
and hopes that the practical realization of the outcome of the referendums 
will be carried out in a civilized manner.”85 
Referenda and plebiscites are emblematic of democracy and public 
participation. But they can also be used as a mask for territorial expansion. 
Wilhelm Grewe noted that Napoleonic France used the language of self-
determination and the process of referenda “to disguise an unrestrained 
policy of expansion.” The 1795 plebiscite in Austrian Netherlands (which 
became Belgium) was later called a “bitter comedy.”86 
Referenda in separatist enclaves are nothing new. Transnistria has 
repeatedly attempted to use plebiscites to claim independence from 
                                                                                                                      
84. Lavrov Interview, supra note 44. 
85. Moscow in No Rush to Respond to Donetsk People’s Republic Plea for Accession, RUSSIA 
TODAY (May 12, 2014), http://rt.com/op-edge/158528-russia-response-ukraine-done 
tsk/. The motivation behind the restrained response is a topic of speculation. As will be 
discussed below, one possible reason is that forcibly separating these regions from 
Ukraine would not serve a useful foreign policy goal, while putting their political future in 
play—and thus the subject of ongoing mediation with Ukraine and the EU—would likely 
be more effective. 
86. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (Michael Byers 
trans., 2000), quoting ROBERT REDSLOB, HISTOIRE DES GRANDS PRINCIPLES DU DROIT 
DES GENS 320 (1923). 
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Moldova and possible unification with Russia.87 They have received no 
support from the international community (and, as of this writing, Russia 
has not endorsed Transnistria’s unification with the Russian Federation). 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia also used referenda in their bids for 
independence; Russia did reference those referenda in its statement 
recognizing each as new States.88 
International law does not confer any special status on referenda and, 
as a matter of practice, the international community has not given much 
weight to referenda that do not have the backing of the pre-existing State. 
Back in the interwar period, the Aaland Islands attempted to use a 
referendum to secede from Finland. The International Commission of 
Jurists that assessed the situation for the League of Nations found that 
there was no right of national groups to separate by the simple expression 
of a wish.89  
Of particular relevance to Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the ability to 
choose secession by plebiscite must be granted by the State itself, in this 
case, Ukraine.90 The role of referenda is not a question of international law, 
but of domestic law. Assuming there is no right of remedial secession, it is 
only the Ukrainian Constitution that could confer a right to Crimea to 
leave by referendum. Title X of the Ukrainian Constitution concerns the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea; there is no mention of secession by act 
of regional parliament or by local referendum. Moreover, Article 73 of the 
Ukrainian Constitution requires any referendum concerning territorial 
                                                                                                                      
87. I discuss the 2006 Transnistrian referendum in Chris Borgen, Secession by 
Referendum?, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2006), http://opiniojuris.org/2006/09/17/secession-
by-referendum/. 
88. President Medvedev said: “Considering the freely expressed will of the Ossetian 
and Abkhaz peoples and being guided by the provisions of the UN Charter, the 1970 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between 
States, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other fundamental international 
instruments . . . .” Statement, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev (Aug. 26, 2008), 
available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_2 
05752.shtml. 
89. See the Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council 
of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal 
Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Off. J. Spec. Supp. No. 3, at 
5–10 (1920). 
90. To take two examples from the European Union, consider the different 
receptions of the referendum in Scotland, which was sanctioned by London, and the 
referendum concerning Catalonia, which was not viewed as legal by Madrid.  
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change to be a referendum of all the citizens of the country.91 Even the 
Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea defers to the 
Ukrainian Constitution. Article 1 of the Crimean Constitution states: “The 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall be an integral part of Ukraine and it 
shall solve, within the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution of 
Ukraine, any and all matters coming within its terms of reference.”92 
Consequently, when Vladimir Putin declared in his speech of March 18 
that “[a] referendum was held in Crimea on March 16 in full compliance 
with democratic procedures and international norms,”93 he was wrong. 
More importantly, he had deployed a rhetorical style that would make a 
negotiated resolution, or an undoing of the annexation of Crimea, more 
difficult. By implying that under international law a referendum confers 
upon the population of Crimea a right to secede, then anything less than 
secession will be seen by some as bargaining away one’s rights. This makes 
a negotiated solution difficult and can contribute to the intractability of the 
conflict.94 It may be a savvy strategy to cement one particular outcome—
the absorption of Crimea in Russia—but it is dangerous in terms of later 
effects. Much in the same way as Putin said of Western leaders that they 
did not fully realize what they were doing with Kosovo, and that “the 
second end of the stick” may hit them, one may say the same here of Putin. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
91. Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 23, art. 73. 
92. Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, supra note 22, art. 1. 
93. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. 
94. For an example of the rhetoric, consider this report from CNN:  
 
[L]lawmakers in Crimea voted in favor of leaving the country for Russia and putting it to 
a regional vote in 10 days. 
 
It’s an act that drew widespread condemnation, with Ukrainian interim Prime Minister 
Arseniy Yatsenyuk calling the effort to hold such a referendum “an illegitimate decision.” 
 
“Crimea was, is and will be an integral part of Ukraine,” he said. 
 
Chelsea J. Carter, Laura Smith-Spark & Michael Holmes, Ukraine PM: Crimea “Was, Is and 
Will Be an Integral Part of Ukraine,” CNN (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03 
/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-tensions/index.html?hpt=hp_t1. 
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4. Recognition (But of What?) 
 
Protracted arguments over secession typically transform into debates over 
recognition and non-recognition.95 There are different types of recognition: 
the recognition of statehood, of a government, of a belligerency and of 
territorial change. Most secessionist conflicts become questions of 
recognition of statehood. In the case of Crimea, at issue is whether Crimea 
deserved to be recognized as a State, whether Russia’s recognition of 
Crimea was illegal and the legal effects of Russia’s recognition. 
States generally view the decision to recognize or not recognize an 
entity as a State as a political decision, albeit one that exists within an 
international legal framework. That legal framework is in part the norms 
defining statehood. The standard view in international law is that a State 
must have (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a 
government and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other States.96 
While entities that claim statehood often try to do a quick “check the 
box” summary of these criteria and maintain they have all the requirements 
of statehood, the actual assessment is meant to be more rigorous than a 
sound bite. At the time that Crimea declared independence, its territory 
was completely contested—this was not an issue of where the border 
between Crimea and Ukraine should be, but a dispute over the whole of 
Crimea. Moreover, it was very much in doubt whether Crimea had a 
functional government or the capacity to enter into international relations: 
Crimea as a supposedly independent entity would not exist but for Russian 
military intervention. And the control of Crimean territory seemed to be 
more under the command of the Russian President than the Crimean 
authorities.  
                                                                                                                      
95. Daniel Thürer, Self-Determination, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 364, 371 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) (“Rather than formally recognizing a right of 
secession . . . international law only became subsequently relevant within the context of 
recognition.”). 
96. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 
Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 19. One example of a national interpretation is Section 201 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law: “Under international law, a state is an entity that 
has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own 
government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with 
other such entities.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 201 (1987). 
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What does the law of recognition have to say when it is doubtful that 
Crimea even meets the basic requirements of statehood? Can Russia 
nonetheless legally recognize Crimea as a State? While recognition is a 
political act, it does not ignore legality. In the edition of James Brierly’s 
treatise edited by Humphrey Waldock, the text states that 
 
[i]t is impossible to determine by fixed rules the moment at which other 
states may justly grant recognition of independence to a new state; it can 
only be said that so long as a real struggle is proceeding, recognition is 
premature, whilst, on the other hand, mere persistence by the old state in 
a struggle which has obviously become hopeless is not a sufficient cause 
for withholding it.97 
 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote in his 1947 treatise Recognition in 
International Law that non-recognition “is the minimum of resistance which 
an insufficiently organized but law-abiding community offers to illegality; it 
is a continuous challenge to a legal wrong.”98 The International Law 
Association’s Committee of Recognition and Non-Recognition wrote in 
their 2014 Interim Report: 
 
One possible reason for not recognizing an entity as a state is that it was 
formed through a territorial change from a use of force by one existing 
State against another. Some have argued that “[t]hird States . . . may be 
prevented from according recognition as long as the injured state does 
not waive its rights since such a unilateral action would infringe the rights 
of the latter State,” or that the lack of independence of an aspirant entity 
in relation to some other State is cause for non-recognition.99 
 
                                                                                                                      
97. JAMES BRIERLY, The Law of Nations 138 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 
1963). 
98. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (1947). 
99. International Law Association Committee on Recognition and Non-recognition, 
Interim Report 3 (Mar. 2014) (Christopher Borgen & Aziz Tuffi Saliba, co-rapporteurs), 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1032; then follow Con-
ference Report 2014 Washington hyperlink [hereinafter ILA Recognition Committee 
Interim Report], with internal citations to Karl Doehring, Effectiveness, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43, 47 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995) and Jochen A. 
Frowein, Recognition, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Rudolph 
Bernhardt ed., 2000). As co-rapporteur I participated in the drafting of, and deliberation 
over, the quoted text. 
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However, State practice has not given clear evidence of a general 
obligation of non-recognition.100 Nonetheless, there is evidence of States 
arguing that in particular circumstances recognition would be a violation of 
international law. Most commonly noted are instances where secessionist 
entities (a) have not met the criteria for statehood and/or (b) would be 
against the views of the pre-existing State.101 
Based on such criteria, Russia’s recognition of Crimea may have been a 
breach of international law. First, as mentioned above, Crimea probably 
did not meet the standards of statehood. Moreover, the facts that made 
Crimea’s move towards independence possible were Russia’s stealthy (and 
still unadmitted) intervention. Thus, the recognition would prolong 
another illegality—a violation of the UN Charter norm of non-intervention 
in domestic affairs. These were the types of argument that Russia itself 
made against the recognition of Kosovo. In early 2009, Russian Foreign 
Minister Lavrov had referred to the “the unilateral—contrary to 
                                                                                                                      
100. ILA Recognition Committee Interim Report, supra note 99, at 4–6. 
101. See id. at 5–7. Concerning U.S. practice, see, e.g., Russia Recognises Georgian Rebels, 
BBC (Aug. 26, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7582181.stm (“Late on 
Monday [August 25, 2008], the U.S. State Department had warned that recognition of the 
two provinces’ independence would be ‘a violation of Georgian territorial integrity’ and 
‘inconsistent with international law.’ In a statement, it said President George W Bush had 
called on Russia's leadership to ‘meet its commitments and not recognise these separatist 
regions.’”). Id. See also Press Statement, Embassy of the United States to Georgia, Acting 
Deputy Spokesman, Mark C. Toner, Visit by Russian Officials to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (Apr. 30, 2011), available at http://georgia.usembassy.gov/latest-news/official-stat 
ements-2011/russian_officials_abkhasia_s_ossetia.html (stating “Russia’s recent efforts to 
conclude formal state-to-state agreements with the ‘de facto’ authorities in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia during a visit this week to those separatist regions are inconsistent with the 
principle of territorial integrity and Georgia’s internationally recognized borders.”). West 
Rejects Treaty Between Russia and Abkhazia, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-abkhazia-nato-european-union-united-states-
/26708819.html. 
Certain European States are especially critical of secession and also argued that the 
recognition would be a violation of international law. For example, the Cypriot Foreign 
Minister warned against the EU “breaking international law” by recognizing Kosovo. 
Harry de Quetteville & Bruno Waterfield, EU-US Showdown with Russia over Kosovo, 
TELEGRAPH (London) (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
1572229/EU-US-showdown-with-Russia-over-Kosovo.html. And, on the day following 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Spain’s Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos 
said, “We will not recognise [Kosovo] because we consider . . . this does not respect 
international law.” Ingrid Melander, Spain Says Won’t Recognize Kosovo Independence, REUTERS 
(Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/18/idUSL18645227. 
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international law—recognition of Kosovo’s independence” by certain 
States.102  
In any case, regardless of whether they view such recognition as 
formally illegal, if other States perceive the recognition of an aspirant State 
as premature, then they will likely withhold recognition. South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia have each been recognized by four States: Russia, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua and Vanuatu (Nauru and Tuvalu have withdrawn previous 
statements of recognition). Other secessionist entities are in similar twilight 
zones. No UN member States have recognized Transnistria or Nagorno-
Karabakh. Northern Cyprus is recognized only by Turkey. Such twilight 
regimes are unable to join the UN, or receive assistance from the World 
Bank, or the International Monetary Fund. They do not participate in the 
World Trade Organization. Each becomes the supplicant of whatever State 
is most directly supporting them—Turkey, in the case of Northern Cyprus, 
Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia for South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
and Transnistria. By contrast Kosovo, which Russia has portrayed as a 
prime example of illegal recognition, has been recognized—as of this 
writing—by 110 States.103 
But, unlike these other cases, Crimea never even started the game of 
courting international recognition. Crimea began instead with a declaration 
of independence that would automatically take effect upon a referendum 
for independence. This was followed by a declaration of recognition by 
Russia right after the referendum. And just over a day later Russia and 
Crimea signed a treaty of merger. The recognition of Crimea by Russia was 
the legal fig leaf which allowed Russia to say that it did not annex Crimea 
from Ukraine, rather the Republic of Crimea exercised its sovereign 
powers in seeking a merge with Russia.104  
At issue now is not the non-recognition of an aspirant State, but rather 
non-recognition of the territorial change of Russia. This alters the calculus 
                                                                                                                      
102. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Remarks and Response to 
Questions at Press Conference on 2008 Foreign Policy Outcomes at MFA (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) (Jan. 16, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/AF09FEECD4A871A8C3257540005AECE3). 
103. I undertake a longer comparison of the cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia, in Borgen, Great Powers, Small States, and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination, supra 
note 6.  
104. Regarding mergers, see 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL 
LAW § 62 at 210 (“Absorption or merger”) (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 
1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM’S (NINTH)].  
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of power: there are many levers of power that one can use against an 
aspirant State such as South Ossetia. Denying an aspirant State the benefits 
of membership in the international community comes at little to no cost to 
existing States. However, in the case of non-recognition of territorial 
change, one would need to sanction the (already existing) State that has 
undertaken this territorial change. While sanctioning an aspirant State may 
be costly to the aspirant, sanctioning a powerful State may be costly to the 
norm-enforcing States.  
Thus, by quickly recognizing and then signing a treaty of merger with 
Crimea, Russia accomplished three things: (a) it provided a veneer of 
legality to its annexation of part of Ukraine, dubbing it a “reunification”; 
(b) it avoided the costs of the non-recognition of Crimea as a State; and (c) 
it increased the cost of enforcement by making Russia itself the party 
against whom enforcement would need to be sought. At times the use of 
legal language is an attempt to give other States a credible excuse not to act, 
not to enforce legal norms when an argument can be made either that there 
was no violation or that the situation is too complex to warrant precipitous 
action.  
Just as the experience of South Ossetia and Abkhazia provided a lesson 
to Russia in how to manage the situation in Crimea,105 there are indications 
that the experience in Crimea may have provided a lesson for Russia 
regarding Abkhazia. After years of neglect there are indications that Russia 
may now be moving towards annexing Abkhazia through a series of 
treaties.106 
 
C. A New Theory: Righting Historical Wrongs? 
 
What may be most striking is the new direction of Russia’s argumentation 
in the Crimean case. Russia only made passing reference to the language of 
self-determination and instead used a rhetoric of history and ethnicity that 
harkens back to pre-UN Charter norms. It remains to be seen whether 
                                                                                                                      
105. See, e.g., Michael Cecire, South Ossetia and Abkhazia Analysis, sidebar to Patrick 
Jackson, Ukraine Crisis: “Frozen Conflicts” and the Kremlin, BBC (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www 
.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29078541? (stating “Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia was in many ways self-defeating. One suspects the errors of this strategy at 
least partially motivated the Russian decision to opt for direct annexation of Crimea rather 
than ‘recognise’ yet another rump statelet.”). 
106. See West Rejects Treaty Between Russia and Abkhazia, supra note 101.  
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia will continue to apply this line of reasoning in other cases in the 
Near Abroad or if this truly is a “special case” and an anomaly. This shift in 
rhetoric has not gone unnoticed by Russian international lawyers. 
According to Anton Moiseienko, at a recent conference Professor Stanislav 
Chernichenko “referred to the restoration of Russia’s ‘historic rights’ rather 
than to Crimea’s self-determination (although he did not discard the latter 
either). Indeed, he noted that Russia’s reliance on Kosovo’s precedent was 
inconsistent with Russia’s own position on Kosovo.”107 
This shift to an argument based on historical grievance was apparent in 
the UN Press Office summary of Ambassador Churkin’s remarks in the 
General Assembly’s March 27th debate on the resolution against Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea: 
 
Crimea had been reunified with the Russian Federation. “We call on 
everyone to respect that voluntary choice,” he said, adding that his 
Government could not refuse Crimeans their right to self-determination. 
Historical justice had been vindicated, he noted, recalling that for many 
years, Crimea had been part of the Russian Federation, sharing a 
common history, culture and people. An arbitrary decision in 1954 had 
transferred the region to the Ukrainian Republic, upsetting the natural 
state of affairs and cutting Crimea off from Russia.108 
 
                                                                                                                      
107. Moiseienko, supra note 52. Chrenichenko is one of the co-authors of the article 
in note 33 that included a comparison taken from a series of conferences in 2001 of 
Russian, American and European views on self-determination. 
108. General Assembly Adopts Resolution, supra note 2. In his March 18 speech, 
President Putin said: 
 
In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This 
firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to 
generation, over time, under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our 
country went through during the entire 20th century. 
 
Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. One month later, Putin also made some brief 
allusions to territorial irredentism regarding eastern Ukraine as well: 
 
[O]n April 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin . . . suddenly began using the word 
[Novorossiya] during his annual televised question-and-answer sessions with the nation. 
“Under the tsars, this region was called Novorossiya,” he said. “These territories were 
passed on to Ukraine in the 1920s. Why the Soviet government did that, may God judge 
them.” 
 
Caryl, supra note 65. But see Patricia Herlihy, Op-Ed., What Vladimir Putin Chooses not to 
Know about Russian History, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.latimes 
.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-herlihy-russia-ukraine-odessa-20140501-story.html. 
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What had once seemed definite—Ukraine’s border—was now open to 
question. Gone were the bright lines that Russia had said existed at the 
time of the Kosovo debates: that inasmuch as Serbia did not consent to an 
alteration of its territory and borders, there could be no legal recognition of 
Kosovar independence. Gone was the talk of obligations of non-
recognition. Now we hear about returning things to their “natural state of 
affairs.” But natural to whom? Russian positivist arguments were replaced 
with notions of right based on history and ethnicity that verged on the 
mystical.109 
In the face of these historical yearnings and increasingly quasi-mystical 
language is a tradition of black-letter law supporting territorial integrity. 
The basic principle of the non-use of force and the respect of territorial 
integrity is set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  
After the dissolution of the USSR, the 1991 Agreement Establishing 
the Commonwealth of Independent States stated that Russia and other CIS 
member States would respect “the inviolability of existing borders within 
the Commonwealth.”110 Within two years, the Charter of the Common-
wealth of Independent States was completed and signed and stated that its 
members shall build their relation upon, among other things, “the 
recognition of existing borders and the rejection of unlawful territorial 
                                                                                                                      
109. Putin said in his meeting with young historians in November 2014: 
 
[F]or ethnic Russians (I mean that particular segment of our multi-ethnic peoples—ethnic, 
Orthodox Russians), Crimea has a kind of sacred significance. After all, it was in Crimea, 
in Hersonissos, that Prince Vladimir was baptised, subsequently baptising Rus. The first, 
initial font of Russia’s Baptism is there. 
 
And what is Hersonissos? It is Sevastopol. You can see the connection between the 
spiritual source and state component, meaning the fight for Crimea overall and for 
Sevastopol, for Hersonissos. In essence, the Russian people have been fighting for many 
years to gain a firm foothold in its historical font. This is extremely important. 
 
Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Remarks Meeting with Young Academics and History 
Teachers (Nov. 5, 2014) (transcript available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president 
/news/46951). 
110. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States art. 5, Dec. 
8, 1991, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 143, 144 (1992); Summers, supra note 74, 
at 111. 
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annexations.”111 In addition, upon Ukraine’s joining the non-proliferation 
treaty and transferring the nuclear weapons on its territory, Russia, the 
United States and the United Kingdom signed, along with Ukraine, a 
security agreement known as “the Budapest Memorandum,” which stated 
that the parties “reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with 
the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and 
Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.”112 
These treaty commitments further underscore customary international 
law obligations to respect territorial integrity and the non-violability of 
borders. Also relevant is the more specific concept uti possidetis juris.113 
Originally used in the decolonization of Latin America in the nineteenth 
century, uti possidetis meant that borders of former colonies that achieved 
independence would mirror their previous colonial boundaries. This 
principle was subsequently applied in the decolonizations of the twentieth 
century, and, with greater controversy, to the newly independent States 
after the end of the Cold War. In this last case, the Badinter Commission 
found that the exercise of self-determination “must not involve changes to 
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except 
where the States concerned agree otherwise.”114 This is reiterated in 
Opinion 3, which notes that uti possidetis has become recognized as a 
“general principle” of international law.115 The Helsinki Final Act also 
provided for inviolability of borders and forbade the acquisition of another 
                                                                                                                      
111. Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States art. 3, Jan. 22, 1993, 1819 
U.N.T.S. 58, reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1279, 1283–84 (1995). See 
also Summers, supra note 74, at 111. 
112. Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 5, 1994, reprinted in 
A/49/765, S/1994/1399, annex I (Dec. 19, 1994), available at http://en.wikisource.org 
/wiki/Ukraine._Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances. 
113. See generally OPPENHEIM’S (NINTH), supra note 104, §235 at 669–70 (“Uti 
possidetis”). For a detailed discussion of the history of uti possidetis, see Evison, supra note 82, 
at 92–99. 
114. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 2, supra note 7.  
115. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 3, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
1499 (1992). The ICJ had also written in Burkina Faso v. Mali that uti possidetis “is not a 
special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general 
principle which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of 
independence, wherever it occurs.” Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 
¶ 20 (Dec. 22). 
 
 
 
Law, Rhetoric, Strategy                 Vol. 91 
 
259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State’s territory through the threat or the actual use of “direct or indirect 
measures of force in contravention of international law.”116  
As the USSR dissolved in the closing days of 1991, it was replaced by 
fifteen new States, all former Union republics.117 As new States they were 
entitled to territorial integrity. But, of course, there is the possibility of 
dispute over what should be the relevant borders. The principle of uti 
possidetis is of use in such situations by delimiting the relevant State borders 
as being those of the pre-existing colony or (based on the Badinter 
Commission’s extension of the principle) pre-existing administrative 
boundary. Consequently, in addition to treaty-based obligations, Russia has 
the obligation under customary international law to respect the pre-existing 
boundaries of Ukraine. Due to uti possidetis (as well as the numerous treaties 
if had signed) this would include Crimea (and, of course, all of eastern 
Ukraine). 
Russia’s new emphasis on irredentist rhetoric does not reflect the actual 
substance of international law. One country cannot unravel another 
country’s internationally recognized statehood with some vague references 
to a preferred historical “natural state of affairs.” To the contrary, 
international legal doctrines of sovereignty, effective dates of boundaries 
and non-intervention deliberately do not give weight to such historical 
grievances because almost every country can point to some past wrong and 
some previous territorial distribution that they believe is more just. 
International law is not an invitation to troll through history and 
unilaterally change whatever territorial distribution you think is wrong. 
Despite the weight of treaty law and customary international law, 
looking back on the 1990’s President Putin explained, “Russia seemed to 
have recognized Crimea as part of Ukraine, but there were no negotiations 
                                                                                                                      
116. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act princ. 3, 4, Aug. 
1, 1975, 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1292, 1294 (1975), available at 
http://www.osce.org/mc/39501. 
117. Under the Soviet Constitution, there were differing levels of administrative 
order. “Union republics” had the highest form of sovereignty within the USSR. When the 
USSR dissolved, the Union republics such as Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine became new sovereign States. “Autonomous republics” such as Abkhazia (in 
Georgia), North Ossetia and the Chechen-Ingush Republic (both in Russia), did not have 
that level of sovereignty; they were subsidiary entities. “Oblasts” or regions, included 
South Ossetia and Adjaria (both in Georgia) and similarly had a lower level of rights than 
Union republics. See generally Summers, supra note 74, at 92.  
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to limit borders.”118 Regardless as to whether or not there were protracted 
negotiations, Russia signed multiple treaties with obligations to respect 
those borders. As the ICJ wrote in its Temple of Preah Vihear decision: “In 
general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the 
primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the 
line so established can, at any moment, on the basis of a continuously 
available process, be called into question.”119 U.S. Ambassador to the UN 
Samantha Power captured this sense when she stated: “We also stand with 
international law and norms and the fundamental principle that borders are 
not suggestions.”120 
Given these obligations, it is of little surprise that Russia decided to 
adopt a completely different framing of the issues in its annexation of 
Crimea. This disjuncture with much international legal discourse does not 
mean that Russia’s recent arguments should be ignored: 
 
This kind of ethnic mysticism is difficult for Westerners to understand. 
Complacently confident of the universality of Western liberal values, they 
regard such thinking as the product of a benighted age. [Canadian] Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, for instance, referred to the Russian leader as a 
“throwback” to the era of 19th century imperialism following the 
Crimean annexation. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry declared Putin to 
be on the “wrong side of history.” But arguably it is Harper and Kerry 
whose comprehension of history is out of whack. They, like other 
Western leaders, continue to assume the end of the Cold War ensure[s] 
the coming-to-be of a new world order that would eventually see liberal 
democracy and Western values encircle the globe.121 
 
Russia’s irredentist rhetoric is popular both within Russia and in certain 
other separatist regions in its Near Abroad.122 The West needs to 
remember that it is not the only one listening to what Russia is saying. The 
                                                                                                                      
118. Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. (emphasis added). 
119. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 34 (June 15). See also 
FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 15, at 153. 
120. Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, Remarks at a Security Council Meeting on Ukraine (Apr. 13, 2014) (transcript 
available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/224764.htm). 
121. Robert Sibley, The Expansionist Behind Putin, OTTAWA CITIZEN (May 2, 2014), 
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/the-expansionist-behind-putin. 
122. See, e.g., Moldova’s Trans-Dniester Region Pleads to Join Russia, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26627236. 
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West may not even be the primary audience to whom Russia is speaking. 
And Russia’s rhetoric can frame expectations about what is or is not 
acceptable under international law.  
 
IV. STRATEGY: THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND THE USES OF LEGAL RHETORIC  
 
Part II considered the current state of the law of self-determination. With 
the law as background, Part III examined how Russia uses rhetoric that 
claims to be based on international law in its public statements about 
Crimea. Comparing Russia’s arguments in the six years between Kosovo 
and Crimea, it analyzed the shifts in Russia’s arguments from case to case. 
Part IV will suggest possible reasons why Russia has changed its legal 
rhetoric. 
 
A. Explaining Russia’s Use of Legal Argument 
 
Considering Russia’s statements regarding Kosovo, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, and Crimea, a few themes are apparent in how Russia’s rhetoric 
about self-determination and sovereignty has changed. 
Sovereignty becomes ephemeral. The most significant change in Russia’s 
shifting rhetoric is that State sovereignty loses its central place. This has 
two related aspects in Russia’s arguments concerning self-determination 
and secession. The first is that sovereignty moved from being the core 
value that was protected by international law, to simply a fact that may or 
may not come into play in a particular circumstance.  
The “will of the people” is redefined. The second aspect is Russia’s pivot 
away from focusing on sovereign rights and towards a specific 
understanding of the phrase “will of the people.” Russia reconceptualized 
“will of the people” from being the preferences of the total population of 
the pre-existing State (Serbia, in the case of the Kosovo crisis) to just that 
of the population of the separatist enclave. This new interpretation became 
evident in Russia’s arguments justifying its intervention in Georgia in 
support of the separatists.  
A new emphasis on correcting historical wrongs. In the Kosovo crisis, Russia’s 
argument was an explanation why self-determination does not lead to a 
right of secession. It was an argument that had much support in terms of 
general State practice, but which did not sit easily with Russia’s direct 
assistance to separatist militias in conflict with the governments of 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2015 
262 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Russia’s rhetoric regarding Crimea is 
not about territorial integrity but territorial irredentism. 
Embracing the “special case” terminology. After sharply criticizing the United 
States and certain European countries for repeatedly arguing that Kosovo 
does not set a precedent because it is a “special case,”123 Russia adopted 
this rhetoric itself, regarding Crimea.124 
These new arguments mark a break with Russia’s earlier statements and 
State practice. From 1991–2008, Russia supported certain separatist 
movements in its Near Abroad but did not grant recognition to any of 
these entities. Since Kosovo’s declaration, Russia has recognized three: 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea. However, this is not merely a case of 
“turnabout is fair play.” Russia continues to attempt to clothe its 
arguments in legalistic language, even though, according to Lauri Mälksoo,  
 
the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation goes against pretty 
much everything that has been written in Russia over the last twenty years 
(plus during the Soviet period) on the legality of the use of military force 
and the right or peoples to self-determination in international law in non-
colonial contexts.125 
 
The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs had previously argued against 
novel legal arguments: 
 
                                                                                                                      
123. For example, Vladimir Putin said in his March 18th speech concerning Crimea: 
 
We keep hearing from the United States and Western Europe that Kosovo is some special 
case. What makes it so special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is the fact 
that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many human casualties. Is this a legal argument? 
The ruling of the International Court says nothing about this. This is not even double 
standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism. One should not try so crudely to 
make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black 
tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make sure every conflict leads to human 
losses. 
  
Putin, Crimea Address, supra note 42. 
124. Lavrov said in a September 2014 interview: “I believe that Crimea was a very 
special case, a unique case from all points of view. Historically, geopolitically, and 
patriotically, if you wish. The situation in the southeast of Ukraine is different. There is 
nothing like the unity we saw in Crimea.” Lavrov Interview, supra note 44. 
125. Lauri Mälksoo, Crimea and (the Lack of) Continuity in Russian Approaches to 
International Law, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-the-
lack-of-continuity-in-russian-approaches-to-international-law/. 
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[A]ttempts to represent violations of international law as its “creative” 
application are dangerous. It is unacceptable that military interventions 
and other forms of interference from without which undermine the 
foundations of international law based on the principle of sovereign 
equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of implementing the 
concept of “responsibility to protect.”126 
 
So why use the language of international law? International law is the 
vocabulary of modern diplomacy; it is the lingua franca. International law 
defines the common terms of discourse. Some terms, such as a “place in 
the sun” or “sphere of influence” used to be part of the accepted 
vocabulary of international relations. No longer. Now States must make 
arguments based on common concepts such as “self-determination” and 
“territorial integrity.” 
Additionally, beyond defining the language of diplomacy, international 
law sets the rules for which words make sense when used together and 
which do not. It is a grammar of international relations.127 States do not 
talk about the “right” to commit “aggression” or the “remedy” of piracy. 
These sentences do not make sense when the words are used in 
conjunction with each other.  
The long debate over self-determination and secession is about 
defining these terms (especially self-determination) and coming to a 
consensus as to their grammatical relationship. Russia went from saying 
that they were only weakly related (at least up through the Kosovo 
debates), to claiming that they are more strongly related and almost 
synonymous (South Ossetia) to all but discarding these terms and bringing 
in a whole new vocabulary when talking about Crimea. 
Diplomatic arguments are a means to an end. They are part of a 
strategy. Russia’s ultimate goal in its Near Abroad seems to be to maintain 
the image, if not the reality, of great power status. Ulrich Speck of Carnegie 
Europe put it this way: 
 
                                                                                                                      
126. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Concept of the Foreign Policy 
of the Russian Federation ¶ 31(b) (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/ 
0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D. 
127. Martti Koskenniemi has described the grammar of international law as “the 
system of production of good legal arguments.” MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY 
TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 568 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2005) (1989). 
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Seeing itself as a classical great power, Russia wants to maximize its 
sovereignty and freedom to act. It does not compare itself to countries 
like Japan, India, Germany or France, which have integrated into the 
global system by accepting U.S. leadership. Instead, Russia, even with 
very limited power resources (besides nuclear weapons) takes the United 
States as the benchmark of its position in the international system. 
Moscow does not seek deep engagement with international institutions 
and international rules, it looks at them merely as instruments to 
aggrandize its power. What counts is power in an archaic sense: the ability 
to force others to do what one wants. The strong can command, the 
weak must obey.128  
 
Western analysts contend that Russia’s ultimate goal is reflected in 
policies and intermediate goals such as: 
 
• attempting to halt the “expansion” of Western institutions in 
eastern Europe;  
• supporting construction of Moscow-led institutions;  
• maintaining a certain level of control over the foreign policies 
of the former Soviet countries in its Near Abroad; and, 
• acting as a guarantor for the millions of ethnic Russians who 
reside in former Soviet republics. 
 
The language of international law, and especially of self-determination, 
can be instrumental in pursuing these intermediate goals. Consequently, 
strategic shifts in emphasis among these intermediate goals may drive the 
changing rhetoric in international legal arguments. 
 
B. International Legal Argument as an Instrument of Foreign Policy 
 
1. Self-Determination Crises as a Means to Hamper an Accession to 
Western International Institutions  
 
The 1990s and early 2000s were a time of international institution building 
and expansion, especially in Europe. The EU added new members from 
eastern Europe and NATO expanded eastward as well, admitting former 
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members of the Warsaw Pact. There was optimistic talk in the West of 
European institutions one day reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals, if 
not the Pacific, with Russia as a member. 
But there was little celebration among certain political leaders in 
Moscow. Anger and frustration over the expansion of NATO into eastern 
Europe became a key theme in Russian foreign policy. It was one that 
Putin reiterated in various statements and it was even part of his speech on 
Crimea: 
 
[T]hey [Western countries] have lied to us many times, made decisions 
behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened 
with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of 
military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: 
“Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say.129 
 
As President Putin’s chief spokesperson put it in November 2014, “[w]e 
have our red lines.”130  
European leaders maintained that accession to a treaty is an issue only 
between the acceding country and the current parties to the treaty. 
Consequently, as a matter of international law, Russia does not have veto 
power over another sovereign State joining a treaty regime to which Russia 
is not already a party.  
While this is correct as a matter of law, as a matter of power projection 
Russia has the ability to affect the political situation within these States 
seeking admission to Western institutions. In the run-up to the European 
Union’s summit in Vilnius in November 2013, when Ukraine was originally 
supposed to sign its association agreement with the EU, Russian politicians 
issued warnings that if Ukraine did not reject the EU treaty, Ukraine would 
run the risk of Russia supporting the partitioning of Ukraine to protect 
ethnic Russians residing there.131 Civil unrest was not an issue at the time, 
only Ukraine agreeing to sign the association agreement. 
Russia’s leadership apparently thought that a self-determination dispute 
could slow Ukraine’s integration into Western international institutions. 
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The specter of a secessionist crisis, arising from attempts to further 
integrate with Western institutions, may have dampened the enthusiasm in 
the Ukrainian citizenry for such integration. Regardless as to whether 
secessionism would change Ukrainian public opinion, there was also the 
possibility that neither NATO nor the EU would have the political will to 
accept a country embroiled in a secessionist conflict. Although the 
association agreement was not the same as accession, there was clearly the 
concern on Russia’s part (and the hope on the part of many Ukrainians) 
that association would be an important step on a road to accession. Both 
the EU treaty and the NATO Charter require unanimous approval for a 
State to join as a new member. A conflict in Ukraine could make it more 
difficult to garner the required votes should accession to either of these 
organizations ever become an issue. 
It was also in Russia’s interest to frame the conflict as a self-
determination crisis within Ukraine as opposed to a Russia objecting to 
Ukraine’s closer association with the EU and NATO. European 
institutions have evolved a practice for addressing self-determination 
disputes in countries in the former USSR, other than in Russia. This is an 
example of an intervention strategy called “norm setting,” which “involves 
the setting of ‘rules of the game’ in which the standards by which the 
legitimacy of self-determination claims, and ultimately state recognition, are 
spelled out by the international community and thereafter enforced in 
some way.”132 Ideally, norm-setting is a multilateral activity defining the 
rules of the relevant community of states.133 
However, Russia is according itself the central role as the norm definer 
and interpreter for its Near Abroad. Russia is (or was) a stakeholder in the 
mediations over Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Georgia. And it is 
now part of mediation over the future of eastern Ukraine. By being a 
mediator as well as having “boots on the ground” in most of these 
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conflicts,134 Russia is able to exert significant structural power in framing 
possible endgames, including issues related to the foreign policies of the 
pre-existing States. 
This would not be possible to the same extent if Russia annexed the 
territory. There needs to be an ongoing conflict requiring mediation. 
Consequently, once Crimea was annexed the viability (and credibility) of 
any mediation regime decreased. As one commentator put it: “When the 
Kremlin gave in to the temptation to annex Crimea, it became necessary to 
replace it with another conflict, in the east. It is against the Kremlin’s 
interests to annex territory because an unresolved dispute gives it the 
opportunity to influence the country involved.”135 
And thus we now have Russia’s call for a mediation process for eastern 
Ukraine, which was explicitly linked to broader security issues. President 
Putin said in August 2014: 
 
There need to be negotiations of substance. [Foreign Minister] Lavrov 
was here, and the diplomats love this term. Negotiations need to work 
out in substance what rights the people in Donbass, Lugansk and the 
entire southeast of Ukraine will have. Their lawful rights and interests 
must be formulated and guaranteed within the framework of modern 
civilised rules. These are the issues that need to be discussed. From there 
I am sure it will be relatively easy to settle matters concerning the border, 
guaranteeing security and so on. But the problem is that they do not 
really want to talk.136 
 
Thus, fostering self-determination conflicts in its Near Abroad, could 
be a gambit to slow integration of these countries into Western institutions. 
Framing these disputes as questions of self-determination led to a response 
that gave Russia a “seat at the table,” when previously it had none. If 
anything, Russia moved from being an outsider to a necessary party in 
regards to the future foreign relations of these countries. And, with the 
region, if not the world, as its audience, responding to these conflicts gave 
Russia the opportunity to use the persuasive rhetoric of self-determination 
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to frame its perspective of what was and was not allowed under 
international law. 
 
2. Legal Arguments as a Means to Support Hybrid Warfare 
 
Russia’s strategy in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has been an amalgamation 
of stealth invasion and quasi-legal rhetoric. The “stealth” part of the 
invasion was to maintain a fig-leaf of deniability and to make the uprising 
in eastern Ukraine seem homegrown, as opposed to Russian-led. This 
strategy of stealth interlocks with Russia’s rhetoric, a quasi-legal/nationalist 
amalgamation that attempts to persuade those who can be persuaded and 
befuddle those who cannot. The rhetoric of self-determination cloaks a 
covert operation. Russia has used such “hybrid warfare” to foster 
intractable conflicts elsewhere in its Near Abroad.137  
One commentator described the combination of covert and clandestine 
activities involved in hybrid warfare: 
 
Leading this defense [of Russia’s “ideological and physical sovereignty”] 
are the elite Spetsnaz and GRU intelligence officers that, as NYU 
Professor Mark Galeotti noted, “The GRU has also shown the rest of the 
world how Russia expects to fight its future wars: with a mix of stealth, 
deniability, subversion, and surgical violence.” The confusing nature of 
low intensity conflicts and the pliability of truth mean that these soldiers 
and operatives are the ideal force for these conflicts. These are the men 
who are trained and equipped to navigate the shifting alliances, battle 
lines and publicly deniable spaces in furtherance of Russia’s political 
objectives.138 
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Hybrid warfare is part of a broader strategy of “reflexive control,” 
which “convey[s] to a partner or an opponent specially prepared 
information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision 
desired by the initiator of the action.”139 Part of this is a matter of 
deception and disinformation, but it goes well beyond that. The 
development of reflexive control theory in Soviet military literature dates 
back to the 1960s.140 Some of its precursors are decades older. The Russian 
military established a school on deception in 1904, which was disbanded in 
1929.141 Today reflexive control is emphasized by instructors at Russia’s 
General Staff Academy and it is even the subject of a new journal founded 
in 2001.142 As Timothy Thomas put it, “[i]n a war in which reflexive control 
is being employed, the side with the highest degree of reflex (the side best 
able to imitate the other side’s thoughts or predict its behavior) will have 
the best chances of winning.”143 
Consider this like defining your opponent’s path without them even 
realizing it: you will know where they will end up, perhaps even before they 
do. International legal arguments can frame issues such that there is 
increasing predictability as to how other parties will react. As described 
above, European powers had a particular way of approaching self-
determination crises. By framing a conflict in this manner, Russia could 
anticipate the likely responses (multilateral mediation, for example). 
Moreover, defining the legal framework can play an important role in 
the actual substantive outcome. Martti Koskenniemi wrote that “[a]bstract 
standards (such as self-determination) justify recognition policies that 
create the reality they purport to reflect” such that sometimes it is a general 
adherence to a norm that does more to bring about statehood than 
effective control of territory.144 
The use of international legal rhetoric in general, and framing an issue 
as a self-determination struggle in particular, can put other actors, such as 
the United States and the EU, on the wrong foot, making it difficult to 
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marshal an effective response. According to a study produced for the 
National Defense Academy of Latvia, one aspect of the “new generation 
warfare” strategies used by Russia is “strongly adhering to legalism.”145 The 
study explains: 
 
Without discussing the legal merit of Russian actions, they were all 
backed by some form of legal act. Putin asked the Russian parliament for 
authorization to use military power in the Ukraine if necessary. Naturally, 
it was granted. Russia uses this fact together with the argument that it 
never used military power in Crimea as a sign of its peaceful intentions. 
Third, Russia denies the idea of it having militarily occupied Crimea, since 
the troops there were local self-defense forces. In addition, that although 
it is true that the number of troops stationed there increased, this is still 
within the limits of the bilateral agreement between Russia and 
Ukraine.146 
 
The use of the rhetoric of self-determination can be used to befuddle 
and confuse treaty obligations and military strategy. The Latvian National 
Defense Academy paper notes that NATO member State obligations of 
collective self-defense are predicated on an “armed attack” on a member 
State. But legal rhetoric can be used to sow seeds of doubt as to whether 
there even was an armed attack: 
 
Supposing a Crimea-like situation occurs in Narva, Estonia, for example. 
Can Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead, what 
Russia would call a “democratic right of self-determination of the same 
nature as Kosovo and Crimea”? How should this issue be managed: 
militarily or politically?147 
 
Besides making it difficult for opponents to organize a response, 
defining a conflict through the optic of self-determination can rally local 
populations. While in some cases (Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, for 
example), these conflicts had deep local roots that predated Russian 
involvement, the heating up and boiling over of Crimea seems to have 
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been because Russia was manning the stove. In either scenario, couching a 
conflict as a struggle for self-determination, including a right to secession, 
can bolster support within local populations.  
Certain separatists undoubtedly have honest aspirations for statehood 
and a desire to defend what they understand to be their rights flowing from 
self-determination. But they were coaxed by a rhetoric that distorted what 
self-determination actually means. The language of self-determination thus 
assists hybrid warfare by rallying local forces, cloaking their actions in a 
language of rights and democracy, and providing cover for Russia to 
intervene both as a belligerent and as a mediator.  
For a sense of the pairing of hybrid warfare with offers of mediation, 
consider this description of conflict in Georgia: 
 
In order to be able to deny the invasion of Russian troops, it was first 
stated that some villages on the Georgian frontier had revolted, 
embittered by the tyranny of the Georgians. . . . Simultaneously, Abkhazia 
had risen in the extreme northwest, close to the Russian border. 
 
It is a remarkable fact that the rebellions broke out precisely in those 
places . . . where large and constantly increasing masses of Russian troops 
had been quartered since November. . . .  
 
The Russian Government stated it had endeavored, out of love of peace 
and benevolence, to help the threatened Georgian regime, and offered its 
mediation between the Georgians and the Armenians. It could not help it 
if Georgia contemptuously rejected this mediation.148 
 
Pause for a moment to consider that this was not written about the 
Russian intervention of 2008. It was written about the Red Army’s 
intervention in 1921.  
 
C. The Multiple Audiences of International Legal Arguments in the Ukraine Crisis 
 
One of the reasons the intractable conflicts of the Russian Near Abroad 
are complex is the multiple parties involved in each conflict. There are the 
secessionists, the pre-existing State, EU member States, the United States 
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and, of course, Russia. There are also key Russian allies, such as 
Kazakhstan and China who are interested in either the conflict itself or, at 
least, how Russia acts in relation to the conflict. And there is the Russian 
public. Consequently, when Russia uses legal rhetoric, it is in part speaking 
to one or more international audiences, but the arguments also serve a 
purpose in the domestic political game.149 
 
1. International Legal Argument and Domestic Politics: Addressing 
Russia’s Citizens 
 
Putin has noted repeatedly the domestic popularity of Russian policy vis-à-
vis Crimea. In his August 2014 speech, after noting that the people of 
Crimea expressed their will in a referendum, Putin continued: “I feel we 
protected [the Crimeans]. And all this has truly greatly united us, including 
the opposition parties that are fairly critical of the authorities in power, 
critically assessing the actions of the authorities with regard to politics and 
the economy.”150 
This is part of a broader political dialogue in Russia that emphasizes 
Russian cultural exceptionalism and, really, a heroic place for Russia in 
world affairs.151 National leaders always want to portray their country not 
only as strong, but also as just. Vladimir Putin is no different. As he 
pursued what he seemingly believed to be in Russia’s strategic interest by 
annexing Crimea and fostering unrest in eastern Ukraine, he explained to 
the Russian citizenry why these are actions not only of a great power, but 
of a moral power. He contrasted this with what he described as the 
hypocrisy and cynicism of the West. Rather than oscillating away from 
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international law, Putin claims that Russia is actually supporting the United 
Nations and international legality (as President Bush claimed when the 
United States invaded Iraq in 2003). 
Sovereignty itself becomes redefined in such a way that aggrandizes the 
scope of Russian sovereignty while minimizing sovereignty claims of post-
Soviet States. In effect, the sovereignty of the countries of the Near 
Abroad are subject to Russia’s interests: 
 
This ideological Putin is also a more forceful iteration that is increasingly 
comfortable using Russia’s military to massage, intimidate and even 
outright invade its neighbors to re-assert its dominance and to defend 
Putin’s conception of Russia’s exceptionalism, and most importantly, its 
sovereignty. 
 
Yet this sovereignty is not just of Russia’s borders, it is also the Russian 
identity, free from the perversions and influence of the West. It is a 
celebration and a call to defend what makes Russia different and 
unique.152 
 
This, in turn, reinforces a sense of difference in Russians’ view of what is, 
or is not, part of international law. In this way, Russia’s reconceptualization 
of international law is used not only to rally separatists in Ukraine, but also 
its own citizens in Russia. 
 
2. Addressing the Near Abroad 
 
Besides frustration with expanding Western institutions, another recurring 
theme is the concern over Russian populations who, in the wake of the 
dissolution of the USSR, are now ethnic minorities in newly independent 
States. The historian Timothy Garton Ash recounts the following:  
 
In 1994, I was half asleep at a round table in St. Petersburg, Russia, when 
a short, thickset man with a rather ratlike face—apparently a sidekick of 
the city’s mayor—suddenly piped up. Russia, he said, had voluntarily 
given up “huge territories” to the former republics of the Soviet Union, 
including areas “which historically have always belonged to Russia.” He 
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was thinking “not only about Crimea and northern Kazakhstan, but also 
for example about the Kaliningrad area.” Russia could not simply 
abandon to their fate those “25 million Russians” who now lived abroad. 
The world had to respect the interests of the Russian state “and of the 
Russian people as a great nation.” 
 
The name of this irritating little man was—you guessed it—Vladimir V. 
Putin . . . .153 
 
This rhetoric has been elevated from comments at conferences to 
diplomatic arguments in Security Council debates. Ambassador Anatoly 
Churkin explained to the Council that “[h]istorically, Russia was the 
guarantor of the security of the people of the Caucasus, and it will remain 
so.”154 Foreign Minister Lavrov wrote in 2009 that “[w]e cannot regard 
people as an ‘adjunct’ of whoever’s territory that may arbitrarily, without 
their consent, pass under the sovereignty of a State in breach of the 
principles of international law . . . .”155  
Such a sense of prerogatives implies the existence of a Russian sphere 
of influence in its Near Abroad.156 Russia, however, argues that it is 
upholding popular democracy in the face of encroaching Western interests 
through expanding institutions, corporate power and fake “color 
revolutions.” In practice, the rhetoric of Russia as regional protector means 
that Russia jealously guards its own sovereign prerogatives, while 
simultaneously exercising a policy as if the States in its Near Abroad had 
“only a diminished sovereignty.”157 
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Although this language may comfort Russian populations in the Near 
Abroad, it can be a source of anxiety for the leaders of those countries. 
The president of Kazakhstan said that:  
 
If the rules set forth in the agreement are not followed, Kazakhstan has a 
right to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union. I have said this 
before and I am saying this again. Kazakhstan will not be part of 
organizations that pose a threat to our independence. Our independence 
is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we 
will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to 
protect it . . . .158 
 
3. Addressing Allies: China  
 
This sense of “diminished sovereignty” is an issue that was of particular 
concern to China. China is a crucial partner in Moscow’s hope to build the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into a Eurasian counterweight 
to the “Atlanticist” power of Western Europe and the United States.159 
Consequently, Russia does not want to take positions that would drive a 
wedge into its relationship China. This makes the rhetoric of self-
determination a delicate issue. 
China has no interest in supporting secessionism. To the contrary, part 
of the SCO’s mission statement is actually to counter separatism.160 China 
has even provided “political cover” for smaller States in the region to 
reaffirm the law of territorial integrity in the face of Russian calls for 
support for South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence.161  
This may further explain why in the Crimean case Russia shifted away 
from the language of self-determination and secession and towards a 
history-based argument emphasizing deep local linkages, calling Crimea “a 
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very special case.”162 Such historically-contingent arguments could be an 
attempt to assuage China’s concerns about separatism and to signal that 
Russia’s rhetoric should not affect China’s interests. Putin specifically 
mentioned China in his speech on Crimea: 
 
At the same time, we are grateful to all those who understood our actions 
in Crimea; we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have 
always considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into 
account the full historical and political context, and greatly appreciate 
India’s reserve and objectivity.163 
 
This may have been an effective rhetorical balm regarding Crimea. 
However, a return to the rhetoric of secession and self-determination 
regarding eastern Ukraine may worry China’s leaders:  
 
Chinese media commentary has become more cautious since Putin 
moved on from Crimea to stirring the pot in eastern Ukraine. China’s 
nationalist paper Global Times, which last month spoke of “Crimea's 
return to Russia,” now warns: “Ukraine's eastern region is different from 
the Crimea. Secession of the region from Ukraine strikes a direct blow to 
territorial integrity guaranteed by international law.”164 
 
Moreover, Russia’s “very special case” rhetoric may suffer from the 
same “second end of the stick” problem for which it criticized the West’s 
“special case” arguments concerning Kosovo. Once arguments are made in 
diplomatic fora, they can take on a life of their own. Other groups, 
movements and States may adopt such rhetoric and use it for their own 
purposes, much as Russia did with the West’s justifications for Kosovo. As 
Grewe noted, the arguments of great powers have a way of shaping the 
effective international law of the time. This is one reason why Russia’s 
rhetoric concerning international law is important. If arguments that 
decrease the threshold for intervention and military force go unanswered, 
then other States and non-State actors may start to act accordingly. 
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4. The “Farther Away” 
 
With the traditional focus on how legal rhetoric affects those in Russia’s 
Near Abroad, we perhaps forget that it can also play a role in addressing 
those States that either are not geographically near the conflict or do not 
have a particular political interest in relation to it. Rather than the “Near 
Abroad,” consider them the “Farther Away.” 
The rhetoric of international law can possibly persuade some States, or 
public opinion in foreign countries that a particular party is simply 
defending its rights. For example: “why shouldn’t the people of Crimea 
have a chance to start their own State if the Kosovars did?” Garton Ash 
observes that “[i]t turns out that Vladimir Putin has more admirers around 
the world than you might expect for someone using a neo-Soviet 
combination of violence and the big lie to dismember a neighbouring 
sovereign state.”165 
At the very least, using legalistic rhetoric can muddy the waters, even 
when the legal argument is doctrinally weak. As noted above, the use of 
legal rhetoric can give policymakers in other States an excuse not to 
become involved.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
After all this talk of misuse of legal argument, obfuscation, frustration and 
covert operations, is international law no more than an excuse, a cloak of 
respectability covering up the ugly truths of power? Some say that all this 
talk of laws and rights is worse than irrelevant: it obscures the real issues. 
The American political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote: 
 
One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it 
wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from 
joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its 
foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right 
when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-
determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into 
brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military 
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alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States 
certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about 
Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these 
facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful 
neighbor.166 
 
It is important to be clearheaded about how States can project power 
and the likely efficacy of legal arguments, as well as other strategies, in any 
given situation. But this would mean considering that Russia may be 
effectively using legal arguments to frame the issues, anticipating likely 
responses, fostering support (or at least frustrate opposition), rallying its 
domestic electorate and placing itself at the bargaining table. Russia uses 
legal rhetoric as a component of its strategies in a variety of related games 
such as the game to slow or prevent the expansion of Western institutions, 
the game to maintain great power status in the former Soviet space, the 
game to support Russian ethnic populations in its Near Abroad, the game 
to build cooperative relations with China and the game to shore-up 
domestic support in the midst of economic troubles. 
To simply ignore legal argument is to cede a strategy, to concede 
multiple positions.  
If the EU and the United States do not want another South Ossetia or 
Transnistria in eastern Ukraine, then they will have to actively engage 
Russia’s arguments over what is “right.” Consider this statement by Putin 
from late August 2014, explaining why the events in eastern Ukraine 
confirm that Russia was correct in its actions in Crimea: 
 
Now, I think, it is clear to everyone—when we look at the events in 
Donbass, Lugansk and Odessa—it is now clear to everyone what would 
have happened to Crimea, if we had not taken corresponding measures to 
ensure that people could freely express their will. We did not annex it, we 
did not seize it, we gave people the opportunity to express themselves 
and make a decision and we treated that decision with respect. 
 
I feel we protected them.167 
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Russia’s use of “law talk” is especially striking because it uses quasi-
legal rhetoric so often, even when it has rather weak arguments. While 
Russia deploys legal language, increasingly they are not the concepts of 
international law as generally accepted. Rather, Russia is building a 
revisionist conception of international law to serve its foreign policy needs. 
While the law of self-determination has evolved to foster rights and 
political participation within multi-ethnic States, Russia (although also 
supporting the idea of multi-ethnic States) has returned to the rhetoric of 
ethnic identity and territorial irredentism. Because it is not the state of the 
law, as a matter of strategy the West should not ignore Russia’s rhetoric. 
The use of terms like “self-determination,” “right” and even 
“international law” in speeches by presidents, foreign ministers and 
diplomats may be shunted aside by some as “mere” political speech, much 
as certain international relations theorists set aside mere “law talk.” But 
both of these moves would be short-sighted. The pluralist nature of 
international law means that in most cases there is no final interpreter of 
what law is. Although the rhetoric of international law is not always in 
synchrony with the current state of international law, it can still affect the 
future shape of the law. More so than the ICJ, the most important 
interpreters of international law are the States themselves. Their 
interpretations are in part based on their short-term interests, but also on 
their long-term concerns.  
In the wake of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Russia shifted 
from emphasizing sovereignty and territorial integrity in relation to self-
determination, to a rhetoric based on the will of the people in secessionist 
enclaves. It was a rhetorical shift that may have been to support one or 
more strategies. Russia’s rhetoric regarding its intervention in Georgia in 
2008 in support of south Ossetia and Abkhazia could be interpreted as an 
example of tit-for-tat gamesmanship, warning the United States to refrain 
from further actions that Russia viewed as unilateral. It could also have 
been a message to ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad, as well as the 
governments of those countries. That message would have been that 
Russian ethnics in these newly independent States have a right to self-
determination—meaning, possibly, secession—if the government of those 
States did not respond to their interests. And, moreover, Moscow had a 
right to protect the interests of its co-ethnics. These arguments set off 
hopes and aspirations in Russian ethnic enclaves in Transnistria and 
elsewhere in the Near Abroad. The legal rhetoric over South Ossetia played 
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a part not only in the game over Georgian territorial integrity, but it also 
changed strategies in other games across the Near Abroad. 
Then came Crimea. While Russia had made a shift in its argument 
between Kosovo and South Ossetia, it attempted a different legal theory in 
Crimea. Although Russia continued to note the importance of self-
determination for the people of Crimea, it emphasized the importance of 
righting the historical wrong of Crimea’s transfer by Nikita Khrushchev 
from Russia to Ukraine. The arguments served multiple purposes. The self-
determination issue played a part in muddying the waters and gave some 
countries an excuse to just stay out of the whole situation. The avoidance 
of the rhetoric of secessionism also responded to the concerns of China, a 
country that Russia could not afford to offend. However, this emphasis of 
historical rights also invigorated Russian enclaves in the Near Abroad in 
the hopes that they might be the next Crimea. 
In each of these instances, Russia’s rhetoric was framed by its strategic 
interests, as well as by what could realistically be said within the framework 
of international law. Its use of legal rhetoric, in turn, shaped the 
expectations of States and their populations. Russia’s legalistic rhetoric 
affected international relations.  
International law has become a consensual vocabulary and grammar 
for how States talk about international relations. How States talk about 
terms like “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” can affect the 
legal substance of what “self-determination” and “territorial integrity” are. 
Legal rhetoric can frame policy options and policy outcomes. 
But legal rhetoric can also destabilize international law. Even if Russia 
does not take one more meter of another country’s territory, the effects of 
its legal arguments can be serious.  
The words and phrases of great powers resonate. At times, they 
channel the evolution of international law. Others may adopt similar 
modes of argumentation, similar interpretations, and similar practices. 
Hopefully, Russia’s revisionist justifications concerning Crimea will not 
have this effect. 
 
